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Abstract
We develop a mathematical and interpretative foundation for the enterprise of decision-theoretic
statistical causality (DT), which is a straightforward way of representing and addressing causal
questions. DT reframes causal inference as “assisted decision-making”, and aims to understand
when, and how, I can make use of external data, typically observational, to help me solve
a decision problem by taking advantage of assumed relationships between the data and my
problem.
The relationships embodied in any representation of a causal problem require deeper jus-
tification, which is necessarily context-dependent. Here we clarify the considerations needed
to support applications of the DT methodology. Exchangeability considerations are used to
structure the required relationships, and a distinction drawn between intention to treat and
intervention to treat forms the basis for the enabling condition of “ignorability”.
We also show how the DT perspective unifies and sheds light on other popular formalisa-
tions of statistical causality, including potential responses and directed acyclic graphs.
Key words: directed acyclic graph, exchangeability, extended conditional independence, ignor-
ability, potential outcome, single world intervention graph
1 Introduction
The decision-theoretic (DT) approach to statistical causality has been described and developed
in a series of papers (Dawid 2000; Dawid 2002; Dawid 2003; Didelez et al. 2006; Dawid 2007a;
Geneletti 2007; Dawid and Didelez 2008; Dawid and Didelez 2010; Guo and Dawid 2010; Geneletti
and Dawid 2011; Dawid 2012; Berzuini et al. 2012b; Dawid and Constantinou 2014; Guo et al.
2016); for general overview see Dawid (2007b); Dawid (2015). It has been shown to be a more
straightforward approach, both philosophically and for use in applications, than other popular
frameworks for statistical causality based e.g. on potential responses or directed acyclic graphs.
From the standpoint of DT, “causal inference” is something of a misnomer for the great pre-
ponderance of the methodological and applied contributions that normally go by this description.
A better characterisation of the field would be “assisted decision making”. Thus the DT approach
focuses on how we might make use of external—typically observational—data to help inform a
decision-maker how best to act; it aims to characterise conditions allowing this, and to develop
ways in which it can be achieved. Work to date has concentrated on the nuts and bolts of showing
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how the DT approach may be applied to a variety of problems, but has largely avoided any detailed
consideration of how the conditions enabling such application might be justified in terms of still
more fundamental assumptions. The main purpose of the present paper is to to conduct a careful
and rigorous analysis, to serve as a foundational “prequel” to the DT enterprise. We develop, in
detail, the basic structures and assumptions that, when appropriate, would justify the use of a DT
model in a given context—a step largely taken for granted in earlier work. We emphasise important
distinctions, such as that between cause and effect variables, and that between intended and ap-
plied treatment, both of which are reflected in the formal language; another important distinction
is that between post-treatment and pre-treatment exchangeability. The rigorous development is
based on the algebraic theory of extended conditional independence, which admits both stochastic
and non-stochastic variables (Dawid 1979a; Dawid 1980; Constantinou and Dawid 2017), and its
graphical representation (Dawid 2002).
We also consider the relationships between DT and alternative current formulations of statistical
causality, including potential outcomes (Rubin 1974; Rubin 1978), Pearlian DAGs (Pearl 2009), and
single world intervention graphs (Richardson and Robins 2013a; Richardson and Robins 2013b).
We develop DT analogues of concepts that have been considered fundamental in these alternative
approaches, including consistency, ignorability, and the stable unit-treatment value assumption. In
view of these connexions, we hope that this foundational analysis of DT causality will also be of
interest and value to those who would seek a deeper understanding of their own preferred causal
framework, and in particular of the conditions that need to be satisfied to justify their models.
Plan of paper
Section 2 describes, with simple examples, the basics of the DT approach to modelling problems of
“statistical causality”, noting in particular the usefulness of introducing a non-stochastic variable
that allows us to distinguish between the different regimes—observational and interventional—of
interest. It shows how assumed relationships between these regimes, intended to support causal
inference, may be fruitfully expressed using the language and notation of extended conditional
independence, and represented graphically by means of an augmented directed acyclic graph.
In § 3 and § 4 we describe and illustrate the standard approach to modelling a decision problem,
as represented by a decision tree. The distinction between cause and effect is reflected by regarding
a cause as a non-stochastic decision variable, under the external control of the decision-maker, while
an effect is a stochastic variable, that can not be directly controlled in this way. We introduce the
concept of the hypothetical distribution for an effect variable, were a certain action to be taken, and
point out that all we need, to solve the decision problem, is the collection of all such hypothetical
distributions.
Section 5 frames the purpose of “causal inference” as taking advantage of external data to help
me solve my decision problem, by allowing me to update my hypothetical distributions appropri-
ately. This is elaborated in § 6, where we relate the external data to my own problem by means
of the concept of exchangeability. We distinguish between post-treatment exchangeability, which
allows straightforward use of the data, and pre-treatment exchangeability, which can not so use
the data without making further assumptions. These assumptions—especially, ignorability—are
developed in § 7, in terms of a clear formal distinction between intention to treat and intervention
to treat. In § 8 we develop this formalism further, introducing the non-stochastic regime indicator
that is central to the DT formulation. Section 9 generalises this by introducing additional covariate
information, while § 10 generalises still further to problems represented by a directed acyclic graph.
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In § 11 we highlight similarities and differences between the DT approach to statistical causality
and other formalisms, including potential outcomes, Pearlian DAGs, and single-world intervention
graphs. These comparisons and contrasts are explored further in § 12, by application to a specific
problem, and it is shown how the DT approach brings harmony to the babel of different voices.
Section 13 rounds off with a general discussion and suggestions for further developments. Some
technical proofs are relegated to Appendix A.
2 The DT approach
Here we give a brief overview of the DT perspective on modelling problems of statistical causality.
A fundamental feature of the DT approach is its consideration of the relationships between the
various probability distributions that govern different regimes of interest. As a very simple example,
suppose that we have a binary treatment variable T , and a response variable Y . We consider three
different regimes, indexed by the values of a non-stochastic regime indicator variable FT :
1
FT = 1. This is the regime in which the active treatment is administered to the patient
FT = 0. This is the regime in which the control treatment is administered to the patient
FT = ∅. This is a regime in which the choice of treatment is left to some uncontrolled external
source.
The first two regimes may be described as interventional , and the last as observational . In
each regime there will be a joint distribution for the treatment and response variables, T and Y .
The distribution of T will be degenerate under an interventional regime (with T = 1 almost surely
under FT = 1 and T = 0 almost surely under FT = 0); but T will typically have a non-degenerate
distribution in the observational regime
It will often be the case that I have access to data collected under the observational regime
FT = ∅; but for decision-making purposes I am interested in comparing and choosing between two
interventions available to me, FT = 1 and FT = 0, for which I do not have direct access to relevant
data. I can only use the observational data to address my decision problem if I can make, and
justify, appropriate assumptions relating the distributions associated with the different regimes.
The simplest such assumption (which, however, will often not be easy to justify) is that the
distribution of Y in the interventional active treatment regime FT = 1 is the same as the conditional
distribution of Y , given T = 1, in the observational regime FT = ∅; and likewise the distribution of
Y under regime FT = 0 is the same as the conditional distribution of Y given T = 0 in the regime
FT = ∅. This assumption can be expressed, in the conditional independence notation of Dawid
(1979a), as:
Y ⊥⊥FT | T , (1)
(read: “Y is independent of FT , given T”), which asserts that the conditional distributions of the
response Y , given the administered treatment T , does not further depend on FT (i.e., on whether
that treatment arose naturally, in the observational regime, or by an imposed intervention), and so
can be chosen to be the same in all three regimes.
Note, importantly, that the conditional independence assertion (1) makes perfect intuitive sense,
even though the variable FT that occurs in it is non-stochastic. The intuitive content of (1) is made
1The use of explicit intervention variables such as FT was pioneered by Pearl (1993a); Pearl (1993b), although,
for reasons obscure to this author, he seems largely to have abandoned it very quickly.
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fully rigorous by the theory of extended conditional independence (ECI) (Dawid 1980; Constantinou
and Dawid 2017), which shows that such expressions can, with care, be manipulated in exactly the
same way as when all variables are stochastic.
Property (1) can also be expressed graphically, by the augmented DAG (directed acyclic graph)
(Dawid 2002) of Figure 1. Again, we can include both stochastic variables (represented by round
nodes) and non-stochastic variables (square nodes) in such a graph, which encodes extended con-
ditional independence by means of the d-separation criterion (Geiger et al. 1990) or the equivalent
moralisation criterion (Lauritzen et al. 1990). In Figure 1 it is the absence of an arrow from FT to
Y that encodes property (1).
Y FT T 
Figure 1: A simple augmented DAG
The identity, expressed by (1), of the conditional distribution of Y given T , across all the
regimes described by the values of the regime indicator FT , can be understood as expressing the
invariance or stability (Bu¨hlmann 2018) of a probabilistic ingredient—the conditional distribution
of Y , given T—across the different regimes. This is thus being regarded as a modular component,
unchanged wherever it appears in any of the regimes. When it can be justified, the stability property
represented by (1) or Figure 1 permits transfer (Pearl and Bareinboim 2011) of relevant information
between the regimes: we can use the (available, but not directly interesting) observational data to
estimate the distributions of response Y given treatment T in regime FT = ∅; and then regard these
observational conditional distributions as also supplying the desired interventional distributions of
Y (of interest, but not directly available) in the hypothetical regimes FT = 1 and FT = 0 relevant
to my decision problem.2 Characterising, justifying, and capitalising on such modularity properties
are core features of the DT approach to causality.
A more complex example is given by the DAG of Figure 2, which represents a problem where Z
is an instrumental variable for the effect of a binary exposure variable X on an outcome variable Y ,
in the presence of unobserved “confounding variables” U . Note again the inclusion of the regime
indicator FX , with values 0, 1 and ∅. As before, FX = ∅ labels the observational regime in which
data are actually obtained, while FX = 1 [resp., 0] labels the hypothetical regime where we intervene
to force X to take the value 1 [resp., 0].
The figure is nothing more nor less than the graphical representation of the following extended
conditional independence properties (which it embodies by means of d-separation):
(Z,U) ⊥⊥ FX (2)
U ⊥⊥ Z | FX (3)
2An important aside on notation and terminology. In the potential outcome (PO) approach, the response Y
is artificially split into two, Y0 and Y1, it being supposed that Yt is what is observed in regime Ft—the marginal
distribution of Yt thus being the same as our hypothetical distribution for Y under intervention FT = t. This
duplication of the response is entirely unnecessary for our purposes. Moreover, there is a very prevalent misuse
of terms such as “counterfactual distribution”, or “estimating the counterfactual”, notwithstanding that there is
nothing counter to any known fact involved in considering these distributions, which are to be applied to a new
case. We have termed the interventional distributions of Y hypothetical , since they are predicated on a hypothetical
intervention on a new case. I have elsewhere (Dawid 2007a) expanded on the importance of distinguishing between
hypothetical and counterfactual reasoning, which is jeopardised when we do not also make a clear terminological
distinction.
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Y FX 
U 
X 
 Z 
Figure 2: Instrumental variable with regimes
Y ⊥⊥ Z | (X,U, FX) (4)
Y ⊥⊥ FX | (X,U). (5)
In words, (2) asserts that the joint distribution of Z and U is a modular component, the same
in all 3 regimes, while (3) further requires that, in this (common) joint distribution, we have
independence between U and Z. Next, (4) says that, in any regime, the response Y is independent
of the instrument Z, conditionally on exposure X and confounders U (the “exclusion restriction”);
while (5) further requires that the conditional distribution for Y , given X and U (which, by (4), is
unaffected by further conditioning on Z) be the same in all regimes.
We emphasise that properties (2)–(5) comprise the full extent of the causal assumptions made.
In particular—and in contrast to other common interpretations of a “causal graph” (Dawid 2010)—
no further causal conclusions should be drawn from the directions of the arrows in Figure 2. In
particular, the arrow from Z to X should not be interpreted as implying a causal effect of Z on
X: indeed, the figure is fully consistent with alternative causal assumptions, for example that Z
and X are merely associated by sharing a common cause (Dawid 2010). In general, the causal
content of any augmented DAG is to be understood as fully comprised by the extended conditional
independencies that it embodies by d-separation. This gives a precise and clear semantics to our
“causal DAGs”.
To the extent that the assumptions embodied in Figure 2 imply restrictions on the observational
distribution of the data (i.e., properties (3) and (4), considered only under the operation of the
observational regime FX = ∅), they tally with the standard assumptions made in instrumental
variable analysis (Herna´n and Robins 2006). However, without the additional stitching together of
behaviours under the observational regime and the desired, but unobserved, interventional regimes,
it is not possible to use the observational data to make causal inferences. When, and only when,
these additional stability assumptions can be made can we justify application of the usual methods
of instrumental variable analysis.
In previous work, we have used the above formulation in terms of extended conditional inde-
pendences, involving both stochastic variables and non-stochastic regime indicators, as the starting
point for analysis and discussion of statistical causality, both in general terms and in particular
applications. In this work, we aim to dig a little deeper into the foundations, and in particular to
understand why, when, and how we might justify the specific extended conditional independence
properties previously simply assumed.
5
3 Causality, agency and decision
There is a very wide variety of philosophical understandings and interpretations of the concept of
“causality”. Our own approach is closely aligned with the “agency” interpretation (Reichenbach
1956; Price 1991; Hausman 1998; Woodward 2003; Woodward 2016), whereby a “cause” is under-
stood as something that can (at least in principle) be externally manipulated—this notion being
an undefined primitive, whose intended meaning is easy enough to comprehend intuitively in spite
of being philosophically contentious (Webb 2020). This is not to deny the value of other inter-
pretations of causality, based for example on mechanisms (Salmon 1984; Dowe 2000), simplicity
(Janzing and Scho¨lkopf 2010), probabilistic independence (Suppes 1970; Spohn 2001) or invariant
processes (Bu¨hlmann 2018), or starting from different primitive notions, such as common cause or
direct effect (Spirtes et al. 2000), or one variable “listening to” another (Pearl and Mackenzie 2018).
However, the present work has the limited aim of explicating the agency-based decision-theoretic
approach.
The basic idea is that an agent (“I”, say) has free choice among a set of available actions, and
that performing an action will, in some sense, tend to bring about some outcome. Indeed, whenever
I seriously contemplate performing some action, my purpose is to bring about some desired outcome;
and that aim will inform my choice between the different actions that may be available. We may
consider my action as a putative “cause” of my outcome. This approach makes a clear distinction
between cause and effect: the former is represented as an action, subject to my free choice, while the
latter is represented as an outcome variable, over which I have no direct control. Correspondingly,
we will need different formal representations for cause and effect variables: only the latter will be
treated as stochastic random variables.
Now by my action I generally won’t be able to determine the outcome exactly, since it will
also be affected by many circumstances beyond my control, which we might ascribe to the vagaries
of “Nature”. So I will have uncertainty about the eventual outcome that would ensue from my
action. We shall take it for granted that it is always appropriate to represent my uncertainty by
a probability distribution. Then, for any contemplated but not yet executed action a, there will
be a joint probability distribution Pa over all the ensuing variables in the problem
3, representing
my current uncertainty (conditioned on whatever knowledge I currently have, prior to choosing my
action) about how those variables might turn out, were I to perform action a. We will term such a
distribution Pa hypothetical , since it is premised on the hypothesis that I perform action a.
There will be a collection A of actions available to me, and correspondingly an associated
collection {Pa : a ∈ A} of my hypothetical distributions—each contingent on just one of the actions
I might take. My task is to rank my preferences among these different hypothetical distributions
over future outcomes, and perform that action corresponding to the distribution Pa I like best. I
can do this ranking in terms of any feature of the distributions that interests me.
One such way, concordant with Bayesian statistical decision theory (Raiffa and Schlaifer 1961;
DeGroot 1970), is to construct a real-valued loss function L, such that L(y, a) measures the dissat-
isfaction I will suffer if I take action a and the value of some associated outcome variable Y later
turns out to be y. This is represented in the decision tree of Figure 3.
The square at node ν∗ indicates that it is a decision node, where I can choose my action, a. The
round node νa indicates the generation of the stochastic outcome variable, Y , whose hypothetical
distribution Pa will typically depend on the chosen action a.
3In full generality, the relevant collection of ensuing variables could itself depend on my action a; purely for
simplicity we shall restrict to the case that it does not.
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Figure 3: Decision tree
Since, at node νa, Y ∼ Pa, the (negative) value of taking action a, and thus getting to νa,
is measured by the expected loss L(a) := EY∼Pa{L(Y, a)}. The principles of statistical decision
analysis now require that, at the decision node ν∗, I should choose an action a minimising L(a).
Note particularly that, whatever loss function is used, this solution will only require knowledge
of the collection {Pa} of hypothetical distributions for the outcome variable Y .
There are decision problems where explicit inclusion of the action a as an argument of the loss
function is natural. For example, I might have a choice between taking my umbrella (a = 1) when
I go out, or leaving it at home (a = 0). For either action, the relevant binary outcome variable
Y indicates whether it rains (Y = 1) or not (Y = 0). The loss is 1 if I get wet, 0 otherwise, so
that L(0, 0) = L(0, 1) = L(1, 1) = 0, L(1, 0) = 1. In this case, my action presumably has no effect
on the outcome Y , so that I might take P1 and P0 to be identical; but it enters non-trivially into
the loss function. However, it is arguable whether such a problem, where the only effect of my
action is on the loss, can properly be described as one of causality. In typical causal applications,
the loss function will depend only on the value y of Y , and not further on my action—so that
L(y, a) simplifies to L(y). The only thing depending on a will then be my hypothetical distribution
Pa for Y , subsequent to (“caused by”) my taking action a. Then L(a) = EY∼Pa{L(Y )}, and my
choice of action effectively becomes a choice between the different hypothetical distributions Pa for
Y associated with my available actions a: I prefer that distribution giving the smallest expectation
for L(Y ). This specialisation will be assumed throughout this work.
4 A simple causal decision problem
As a simple specific example, we consider the following stylised decision problem.
Example 1 I have a headache and am considering whether or not I should take two aspirin tablets.
Will taking the aspirins cause my headache to disappear?
Let the binary decision variable FX denote whether I take the aspirin (FX = 1) or not (FX = 0),
and let Z denote the time it takes for my headache to go away. For convenience only, we focus on
Y := logZ, which can take both positive and negative values.
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I myself will choose the value of FX : it is a decision variable, and does not have a probability
distribution. Nevertheless, it is still meaningful to consider my conditional distribution, Px say, for
how the eventual response Y would turn out, where I to take decision FX = x (x = 0, 1). For the
moment we assume the distributions P0, P1 to be known—this will be relaxed in § 5. Where we need
to be definite, we shall, purely for simplicity, take Px to have the normal distribution N (µx, σ2),
with probability density function:
px(y) ≡ p(y |FX = x) = (2piσ2)− 12 exp− (y − µx)
2
2σ2
, (6)
having mean µ0 or µ1 according as x = 0 or 1, and variance σ
2 in either case.
The distribution P1 [resp., P0] expresses my hypothetical uncertainty about how Y would turn
out, if I were to decide to take the aspirin, i.e. under FX = 1 [resp., if I were to decide not to
take the aspirin, FX = 0]. It can incorporate various sources and types of uncertainty, including
stochastic effects of external influences arising or acting between the point of treatment application
and the eventual response. My task is to compare the two hypothetical distributions P1 and P0,
and decide which one I prefer. If I prefer P1 to P0, then my decision should be to take the aspirin;
otherwise, not. Whatever criterion I use, all I need to put it into effect, and so solve my decision
problem, is the pair of hypothetical distributions {P0, P1} for the outcome Y , under each of my
hypothesised actions.
One possible comparison of P1 and P0 might be in terms their respective means, µ1 and µ0, for Y ;
the “effect” of taking aspirin, rather than nothing, might then be quantified by means of the change
in the expected response, δ := µ1−µ0. This is termed the average causal effect , ACE (in terms of the
outcome variable Y—so more specifically denoted by ACEY , if required). Alternatively, we might
look at the average causal effect in terms of Z = eY : ACEZ = EP1(Z)−EP0(Z) = eσ
2/2(eµ1 − eµ0),
or make this comparison as a ratio, EP1(Z)/EP0(Z) = e
µ1−µ0 . Or, we could consider and compare
the variance of Z, varx(Z) = e
2µx(e2σ
2−eσ2) under Px (x = 0, 1). In full generality, any comparison
of an appropriately chosen feature of the two hypothetical distributions, P0 and P1, of Y can be
regarded as a partial summary of the causal effect of taking aspirin (as against taking nothing).
A fully decision-theoretic formulation is represented by the decision tree of Figure 4.
Y P~ 0
i1
i0
Y P~ 1
i
y
y
X
0
1
L(y)
L(y)
Figure 4: Decision tree
Suppose (for example) that I were to measure the loss that I will suffer if my headache lasts
z = ey minutes by means of the real-valued loss function L(z) = log z = y. If I were to take the
aspirin (FX = 1), my expected loss would be EY∼P1(Y ) = µ1; if not (FX = 0), it would be µ0.
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The principles of statistical decision analysis now direct me to choose the action leading to the
smaller expected loss. The “effect of taking aspirin” might be measured by the increase in expected
loss, which in this case is just ACEY ; and the correct decision will be to take aspirin when this is
negative.
Although there is no uniquely appropriate measure of “the effect of treatment”, in the rest of our
discussion we shall, purely for simplicity and with no real loss of generality, focus on the difference
of the means of the two hypothetical distributions for the outcome variable Y :
ACE = EP1(Y )− EP0(Y ). (7)
2
5 Populating the decision tree
The above formulation is fine so long as I know all the ingredients in the decision tree, in particular
the two hypothetical distributions P0 and P1. Suppose, however, that I am uncertain about the
parameters µ1 and µ0 of the relevant hypothetical distributions P1 and P0 (purely for simplicity
we shall continue to regard σ2 as known). To make explicit the dependence of the hypothetical
distributions on the parameters, we now write them as P1,µ1 , P0,µ0 , and denote the associated
density functions by p1(y |µ1), p0(y |µ0).
5.1 No-data decision problem
Being now uncertain about the parameter-pair µ = (µ1, µ0), I should assess my personalist prior
probability distribution, Π say, for µ (in the light of whatever information I currently have). Let
this have density pi(µ1, µ0). To solve my decision problem, I would then substitute, for the unknown
hypothetical distribution P1,µ1(y), my “prior predictive” hypothetical distribution P
∗
1 for Y , with
density
p∗1(y) =
∫ ∫
p1(y |µ1)pi(µ1, µ0) dµ1 dµ0
=
∫
p1(y |µ1)pi1(µ1) dµ1
where pi1(µ1) is my marginal prior density for µ1:
pi1(µ1) =
∫
pi(µ1, µ0) dµ0.
Similarly, I would replace P0,µ0(y) by P
∗
0 , having density p
∗
0(y) =
∫
p0(y |µ0)pi0(µ0) dµ0, where
pi0(µ0) =
∫
pi(µ1, µ0) dµ1 is my marginal prior density for µ0. We remark that, in parallel to the
property that, with full information, I only need to specify the two hypothetical distributions P1 and
P0, when I have only partial information I only need to specify, separately, my marginal uncertainties
about the unknown parameters of each of these distributions. In particular, once these margins
have been specified, any further dependence structure in my joint personal probability distribution
Π for (µ1, µ0) is irrelevant to my decision problem.
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5.2 Data
When in a state of uncertainty, that uncertainty can often be reduced by gathering data. Bayesian
statistical decision theory (Raiffa and Schlaifer 1961) shows that, for any decision problem, the
expected reduction in loss by using additional data (“the expected value of sample information”)
is always non-negative. The effect of obtaining data D is to replace all the distributions entering
in § 5.1 above by their versions obtained by further conditioning on D.
Suppose then that I wish to reduce my uncertainty about µ1, the parameter of my hypothetical
distribution P1, by utilising relevant data. What data should I collect, and how should I use them?
What I might, ideally, want to do is gather together a “treatment group” T of individuals whom
I can regard, in an intuitive sense, as similar to myself, with headaches similar to my own. We
call such individuals exchangeable (both with each other and with me)—this intuitive concept is
treated more formally in § 6 below. I then give them each two aspirins, and observe their responses
(how long until their headaches go away). Conditionally on the parameter µ1 of P1 = P1,µ1 , I
could reasonably4 model these responses as being independently and identically distributed, with
the same distribution, P1,µ1 , that would describe my own uncertainty about my own outcome,
Y , were I, hypothetically, to take the aspirins, and thus put myself into the identical situation
as the individuals in my sample. Conditionally on µ1, I would further regard my own outcome
as independent of those in the sample. We shall not here be concerned with issues of sampling
variability in finite datasets. So we consider the case that the treatment group T is very large.
Then I can essentially identify µ1 as the observed sample mean µ̂1, and so take my updated P1
to be N (µ̂1, σ2).5 For any non-dogmatic prior, this will be a close approximation to my Bayesian
“posterior predictive distribution” for Y , given the data D (conditionally on my taking the aspirins),
and also has a clear frequentist justification.
The above was relevant to my hypothetical distribution P1, were I to take the aspirins. But of
course an entirely parallel argument can be applied to estimating P0, the distribution of my response
Y were I not to take the aspirins. I would gather another large group (the “control group”, C) of
individuals similar to myself, with headaches similar to my own, but this time withhold the aspirins
from them. I would then use the empirically estimated distribution of the response in this group
as my own distribution P0.
Let D = T ∪ C be the set of “data individuals”. Using the responses of D, I have been able to
populate my own decision problem with the relevant hypothetical distributions, P1 and P0. I can
now solve it, and so choose the optimal decision for me.
6 Exchangeability
Here we delve more deeply into the justification for some of the intuitive arguments made above
(and below).
In § 5.2 above, in the context first of estimating my hypothetical distribution P1, we talked of
constructing, as the treatment group T ,
“a group of individuals whom I can regard, in an intuitive sense, as similar to myself,
with headaches similar to my own”.
4See § 6 for formal justification.
5This is of course specific to our assumed normal model (6), and in any case assumes σ2 known. For other models
we might plug in the maximum likelihood estimate (or any other consistent estimate). Still more generally, we could
estimate the distribution P1 nonparametricly, e.g. using the empirical distribution of the sample data.
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The identical requirement was imposed on the control group C. The formal definition and theory of
exchangeability (de Finetti 1937; de Finetti 1975) seeks to put this intuitive conception on a more
formal footing.
We consider a collection I of individuals, on each of which we can measure a number of generic
variables. One such is the generic response variable Y , having a specific instance, Yi, for individual
i—that is, Yi denotes the response of individual i. We suppose all individuals considered are
included in I. In particular, T ⊆ I, C ⊆ I, and I myself am included in I, with label 0, say.
6.1 Post-treatment exchangeability
What we are essentially requiring of T , in the description quoted above, is twofold:
(i). My joint personalist distribution for the responses in the treatment group, i.e. the ordered
set (Yi : i ∈ T ), is exchangeable—that is to say, I regard the re-ordered set (Yρ(i) : i ∈ T )
as having the same joint distribution as (Yi : i ∈ T ), where ρ is an arbitrary permutation
(re-ordering) of the treated individuals.
(ii). If , moreover, I were to take the aspirins, then the above exchangeability would extend to the
set T + := T ∪ {0}, in which I too am included.
Parallel exchangeability assumptions would be made for the control group C, from whom the aspirin
is withheld: in (i) and (ii) we just replace “treatment” by “control”, T by C (and T + by C+), and
“were to take” by “were not to take”. We shall denote these variant versions by (i)′ and (ii)′.
Since the above exchangeability assumptions relate to the responses of individuals after they have
(actually or hypothetically) received treatment, we refer to them as post-treatment exchangeabiity .
Applying de Finetti’s representation theorem (de Finetti 1937) to (i), I can regard the responses
(Yi : i ∈ T ) in the treatment group as independently and identically distributed, from some unknown
distribution.6 This distribution can then be consistently estimated from the response data in the
treatment group. On account of (ii), this same distribution would govern my own response, Y0,
were I to take the aspirins. It can thus be identified with my own hypothetical distribution P1.
Taken together, (i) and (ii) thus justify my estimating P1 from the treatment group data, and using
this to populate the treatment branch of my decision tree.7 Similarly, using (i)′ and (ii)′, I can use
the data from the control group to populate my own control branch. My decision problem can now
be solved.8
6Strictly, this result requires that I could, at least in principle, extend the size of the treatment group indefinitely,
while retaining exchangeability.
7More correctly, I should take account of all the data, in both groups. I regard the associated ordered outcomes
as partially exchangeable (de Finetti 1980), with a joint distribution unchanged under arbitrary permutations of
individuals within each group. Such a joint distribution can be regarded as generated by independent sampling,
from a distribution P1 for an individual in the treatment group, or P0 for an individual in the treatment group,
where I have a joint distribution for the pair (P0, P1). There could be dependence between P0 and P1 in this joint
distribution (for example, they might contain common parameters)—in which case data on responses in the control
group could also carry information about the treatment response distribution P1. Nevertheless, if the treatment
data are sufficiently extensive I can still estimate P1 consistently by ignoring the control data, and so use just the
treatment data to populate the treatment arm of my decision problem.
8 The above argument glosses over a small philosophical problem: Can I justify equating the hypothetical un-
certainty about the response Y , were an individual to take the aspirins, with the realised uncertainty about (still
unobserved) Y , once that individual is known to have taken the aspirins? (and, importantly, nothing else new is
known). The former is what is relevant to my decision problem, but the data on the treated individuals are informa-
tive about the latter. We have implicitly assumed that these uncertainties are the same, and so governed by the same
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Some comments
(1). Whether or not the exchangeability assumption (i) can be regarded as reasonable will be highly
dependent on the background information informing my personal probability assessments. For
example, I might know, or suspect, that evening headaches tend to be more long-lasting than
morning headaches. If I were also to know which of the headaches in T were evening, and
which morning, headaches, then I would not wish to impose exchangeability. I might know
that individual 1 had a morning headache, and individual 2 an evening headache. Then it
would not be reasonable for me to give the re-ordered pair (Y2, Y1) the same joint distribution
as (Y1, Y2)—in particular, my marginal distribution for Y2 would likely not be the same as that
for Y1. However, in the absence of specific knowledge about who had what type of headache—
“equality of ignorance”—the exchangeability condition (i) could still be reasonable.
(2). There may be more than one way of embedding my own response, Y0, into a set of exchangeable
variables. For example, instead of considering other individuals, I could consider all my
own previous headache episodes. (In the language of experimental design, the experimental
unit—the headache episode—is nested within the individual). Then I might use the estimated
distribution of my response, among those past headache episodes of my own that I had treated
with aspirin, to populate the treatment branch of my current decision problem. This might
well yield a different (and arguably more relevant) distribution from that based on observing
headaches in other treated individuals. In this sense there is no “objective” distribution
P1 waiting to be uncovered: P1 is itself an artifact of the overall structure in which I have
embedded my problem, and the data that I have observed.
(3). Exchangeability must also be considered in relation to my own current circumstances. The
exchangeability judgment (i) may not be extendible as required by (ii) if, for example, my
current headache is particularly severe. To reinstate exchangeability I might then need to
restrict attention to those headache episodes (in other individuals, or in my own past) that
had a similar level of severity to mine. Alternatively I might build a more complex statistical
model, allowing for different degrees of severity, and use this to extrapolate from the observed
data to my own case.
(4). We do not in principle exclude complicated scenarios such as “herd immunity” in vaccination
programmes, where an individual’s response might be affected in part by the treatments
that are assigned to other individuals. Assuming appropriate symmetry in (my knowledge
of) the interactions between individuals, this need not negate the appropriateness of the
exchangeability assumptions, and hence the validity of the above analysis—though in this case
it would be difficult to give the underlying distributions P0 and P1, conjured into existence by
de Finetti’s theorem, a clear frequentist interpretation. However, in such a problem it would
usually be more appropriate to enter into a more detailed modelling of the situation.
Exchangeability, while an enormously simplifying assumption, is in any case inessential for the
more general analysis of § 5.2: at that level of generality, I have to assess my conditional distribution
distribution. We may term this property temporal coherence. At a fully general level, any conditional probability
P (A |B) has two different interpretations: the (hypothetical) probability it would be appropriate to assign to A, were
B (and only B) to become known, and the (realised) probability it is appropriate to assign to A, after B (but nothing
else new) has become known. Although it seems innocuous to equate these two, a full philosophical justification is
not entirely trivial (see for example Skyrms (1987)). Nevertheless there is no serious dissent from this position, and
we shall adopt it without further ado.
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for my own response Y0 (in the hypothetical situation that I decide to take the aspirins), given
whatever data D I have available. But modelling and implementing an unstructured prediction
problem can be extremely challenging, as well as hard to justify as genuinely empirically based,
unless we can make good arguments. When appropriate, judgments of exchangeability constitute
an excellent basis for such arguments.
6.2 Pre-treatment exchangeability
The post-treatment exchangeability conditions (i) and (ii), and (i)′ and (ii)′, are what is needed
to let me populate my decision tree with the requisite hypothetical distributions and so solve my
decision problem.
Here we consider another interpretation of the expression “a group of individuals whom I can
regard, in an intuitive sense, as similar to myself, with headaches similar to my own”. This de-
scription has been supposed equally applicable to the treatment group T and the control group
C. But this being the case, then—applying Euclid’s first axiom, “Things which are equal to the
same thing are also equal to one another”—the two groups, T and C (and their headaches), both
being similar to me, must be regarded (again in an intuitive sense) as similar to each other—I
must be “comparing like with like”. But how are we to formalise this intuitive property of the
two groups being similar to each other? We cannot simply impose full exchangeability of all the
responses (Yi : i ∈ D), since I typically would not expect the responses of the treated individuals
to be exchangeable with those of the untreated individuals.
One way of formalising this intuition is to consider all the individuals in the treatment and
control groups before they were given their treatments. Just as I myself can hypothesise taking
either one of the treatments, and in either case consider my hypothetical distribution for my ensuing
response Y0, so can I hypothesise various ways in which treatments might be applied to all the
individuals in I.
Let the binary decision variable Tˇi indicate which treatment is hypothesised to be applied to
individual i.
We first introduce the following Stable Unit-Treatment Distribution Assumption:
Condition 1 (SUTDA) For any A ⊆ I, the joint distribution of YA := (Yi : Y ∈ A), given
hypothesised treatment applications (Tˇi = ti : i ∈ I), depends only on (ti : i ∈ A). In particular,
for any individual i, the distribution of the associated response Yi depends only on the treatment ti
applied to that individual.
As discussed further in § 11.1 below, SUTDA bears a close resemblance to the Stable Unit-Treatment
Value Assumption, SUTVA, typically made in the Rubin potential outcome framework; but—as
reflected in it name—differs in the important respect of referring to distributions, rather than values,
of variables. It is a weaker requirement than SUTVA, but is as powerful as required for applications.
Note that SUDTA is a genuinely restrictive hypothesis, now excluding cases such as the vaccine
example (4) of § 6. However, we will henceforth assume it holds.
In more complex problems there will be other generic variables of interest besides Y—we term
these (including the response variable Y ) domain variables. Then we extend SUTDA to apply to
all domain variables, considered jointly. An important special case is that of a domain variable X
such that the joint distribution of (Xi : i ∈ I), given Tˇi = ti (i ∈ I), does not depend in any way on
the applied treatments (ti). Such a variable, unaffected by the treatment, is a concomitant . It will
typically be reasonable to treat as a concomitant any variable whose value is fully determined before
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the treatment decision has to be made: such a variable is termed a covariate. Other concomitants
might include, for example, the weather after the treatment decision is made.
Let V be a (possibly multivariate) generic variable. I now hypothesise giving all individuals
in I (including myself) the aspirins, and consider my corresponding hypothetical joint distribution
for the individual instances (Vi : i ∈ I). It would often be reasonable to impose full exchangeabil-
ity on this joint distribution, since all members of I would have been treated the same. A similar
assumption can be made for the case that the aspirins are, hypothetically, withheld from all individ-
uals. We term the conjunction of these two hypothetical exchangeability properties pre-treatment
exchangeability (of V , over I).
When I can assume this, then under uniform application of aspirin, by de Finetti’s theorem I can
regard all the (Vi) as independent and identically distributed from some distribution Q1 (initially
unknown, but estimable from data on uniformly treated individuals). Similarly, under hypothetical
uniform withholding of aspirin, there will be an associated distribution Q0. When moreover SUTDA
applies, we can conclude that, under any hypothesised application of treatments, Tˇi = ti (i ∈ I),
we can regard the Vi as independent, with Vi ∼ Qti . We can thus confine attention to the generic
variable V , with distribution Q1 [resp., Q0] under applied treatment Tˇ = 1 [resp., Tˇ = 0].
Pre-treatment exchangeability appears, superficially, to be a stronger requirement than post-
treatment exchangeability: one could argue that (taken together with SUDTA) pre-treatment ex-
changeability implies the post-treatment exchangeability properties (i), (ii), (i)′ and (ii)′, which
would permit me to populate both the treatment and the control branches of my decision tree, and
so solve my decision problem. This would indeed be so if the individuals forming the treatment
and control groups were identified in advance, and then subjected to their appointed interventions.
However, it need not be so in the more general case that we do not have direct control over who gets
which treatment. Much of the rest of this paper is concerned with addressing such cases, considering
further conditions—in particular, ignorability of the treatment assignment process, as described on
§ 7.1 below—that allow us to bridge the gap between pre- and post-treatment exchangeability.
6.3 Internal and external validity
We might be willing to accept pre-treatment exchangeability, but only over the restricted set D
of data individuals, excluding myself—a property we term internal exchangeability . When I can
extend this to pre-treatment exchangeability over the set D+ := D∪{0}, including myself, we have
external exchangeability . In the latter case there is at least a chance that the data D could help
me solve my decision problem—the case of external validity of the data.9 However, when we have
internal but not external exchangeability, this conclusion could, at best, be regarded as holding
for a new, possibly fictitious, individual who could be regarded as exchangeable with those in the
data—this is the case of internal validity . In practice that can be problematic. For example, a
clinical trial might have tightly restricted enrolment criteria, perhaps restricting entry to, say, men
aged between 25 and 49 with mild headache. Even if the study has good internal validity, and
shows a clear advantage to aspirin for curing the headache, it is not clear that this message would
be relevant to a 20-year old female with a severe headache. And indeed, it may not be. Arguments
for external validity will generally be somewhat speculative, and not easy to support with empirical
evidence.
9This is admittedly a very strict interpretation of “external validity”. More generally, it might be considered
enough to be able to transfer information about, say, ACE, from the data to me. This would typically require further
modelling assumptions, such as described in §8.1 of Dawid (2000).
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7 Treatment assignment and application
In § 5.2 we talked in terms of identifying, quite separately, two groups of individuals, in each case
supposed suitably exchangeable (both internally, and with me), where one of the groups is made
to take, and the other made not to take, the aspirins. But typically the process is reversed: a
single group of individuals, D say, is gathered, some of whom are then chosen to receive active
treatment—thus forming the treatment group T—with the remainder forming the control group C.
In this case the treatment process has three stages:
(1). First, the data subjects D are identified by some process.
(2). Secondly, certain individuals in D are somehow selected to receive active treatment, the others
receiving control.10
(3). Finally, the assigned treatments are actually administered.
The operation of stage (1) will be crucial for issues of external validity—if the data are to be
at all relevant for me, I would want the data subjects to be somehow like me. However from this
point on we shall na¨ıvely assume this has been done satisfactorily—alternatively, we consider “me”
to be a possibly fictitious individual who can be regarded as similar to those in the data. We shall
thus consider all data subjects, together with myself, as pre-treatment exchangeable. I can then
confine attention to the joint distributions P1 and P0 over generic variables, under hypothesised
application of treatment 1 or 0, respectively.
For further analysis it will prove important to keep stages (2) and (3) clearly distinct in the
notation and the analysis.
We denote by T ∗ the generic intention to treat (ITT) variable, generated at stage (2), where
T ∗i = 1 if individual i ∈ D is selected to receive active treatment, and T ∗i = 0 if not (this is
relevant only for the external data D: my own value T ∗0 need not be defined). Note that T ∗ is a
stochastic variable. In contrast, we also consider (at stage (3)) the binary non-stochastic generic
decision/regime variable Tˇ : Tˇi = 1 [resp., Tˇi = 0] denotes the (typically hypothetical) situation in
which individual i is made to take [resp., prevented from taking] the aspirins. My own decision
variable Tˇ0 (though not yet its value) is well-defined—indeed, is the very focus of my decision
problem.
Note that when below we talk of “domain variables” we will exclude T ∗ and Tˇ from this de-
scription.
If all goes to plan, for i ∈ D we shall have Tˇi = T ∗i . However, there is no bar to considering,
between stages (2) and (3), what might happen to an individual, fingered to receive the treatment
(so having T ∗i = 1), who, contrary to plan, is prevented from taking it (so that Tˇi = 0)
11—indeed,
10In reality stages (1) and (2) may be combined, as in sequential accrual and randomisation in a clinical trial.
11This apparently oxymoronic combination has some superficial resemblance to counterfactual reasoning (see e.g.
Morgan and Winship (2014)), which has often been considered—quite wrongly in my view (Dawid 2000)—as essential
for modelling and manipulating causal relations. Counterfactual analysis considers the individual after he has been
treated (so with known Tˇi = 1, and possibly known response Yi), and asks what might have happened if—in a fictional
scenario counter to known facts—he had not been treated (i.e., under the counterfactual application Tˇi = 0). In
spite of some parallels, there are important differences between our hypothetical approach and this counterfactual
approach. By considering a time before any treatment has yet been applied, and making the distinction between
intention to treat, T ∗i , and a hypothesised treatment application, Tˇi, we sidestep many of the philosophical and
methodological difficulties associated with counterfactual reasoning. In particular, in our formulation we avoid
counterfactual theory’s problematic and entirely unnecessary conversion of the single response variable Y into two
separate but co-existing “potential responses”, Y (0) and Y (1).
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we have already made use of such considerations when introducing pre-treatment exchangeability.
So we can meaningfully consider a quantity such as E(Y |T ∗ = 1, Tˇ = 0). And indeed it will
prove useful to divorce treatment selection (intention to treat), T ∗, from (actual or hypothetical)
treatment application, Tˇ , in this way. For example, what is usually termed the effect of treatment on
the treated (Heckman 1992) is more properly expressed as the effect of treatment on those selected
for treatment , which can be represented formally as E(Y |T ∗ = 1, Tˇ = 1) − E(Y |T ∗ = 1, Tˇ = 0)
(Geneletti and Dawid 2011).
Since the selection process is made before any application of treatment, it is appropriate to treat
T ∗ as a covariate, with the same distribution in both regimes.
We suppose internal exchangeability, in the sense of § 6.2 above, for the pair of generic variables
(T ∗, Y ). In particular we shall have internal exchangeability, marginally, for the response variable
Y—and, to make a link to my own decision problem, we assume this extends to external exchange-
ability for Y (we here omit T ∗, since that might not even be meaningfully defined for me). However,
even internal exchangeability for Y need no longer hold after we condition on the selection variable
T ∗—this is the problem of confounding . For example, suppose that, although I myself don’t know
which of the headaches in D are the (generally milder) morning and which the (generally more
long-lasting) evening headaches, I know or suspect that the aspirins have been assigned preferen-
tially to the evening headaches. Then simply knowing that an individual was selected (perhaps
self-selected) to take the aspirins (T ∗ = 1) will suggest that his headache is more likely to be an
evening headache, and so change my uncertainty about his response Y (whichever treatment were
to be taken). I might thus expect, e.g., E(Y |T ∗ = 1, Tˇ = t) > E(Y |T ∗ = 0, Tˇ = t), both for
t = 0 and for t = 1. In such a case, even under a hypothetical uniform application of treatment, I
could not reasonably assume exchangeability between the group selected to receive active treatment
(and thus more likely to have long-lasting evening headaches) and the group selected for control
(who are more likely to have short-lived morning headaches). Post-treatment exchangeability is
absent, since I would no longer be comparing like with like. This in turn renders external validity
impossible, since (even under uniform treatment) I could not now be exchangeable, simultaneously,
both with those selected for treatment and with the those selected for control, since these are not
even exchangeable with each other. This means I can no longer use the data (at any rate, not in
the simple way considered thus far) to fully populate, and thus solve, my decision problem.
As explained in § 6.2, assuming internal exchangeability and SUTDA, I can just consider the joint
distribution, Qt, for the bivariate generic variable (T
∗, Y ), given Tˇ = t. Since we are treating the
selection indicator T ∗ as a covariate, its marginal distribution will not depend on which hypothetical
treatment application is under consideration, and so will be the same under both Q1 and Q0. We
can express this as the extended independence property
T ∗⊥⊥ Tˇ , (8)
which says that the (stochastic) selection variable T ∗ is independent of the (non-stochastic) decision
variable Tˇ . We denote this common distribution of T ∗ in both regimes by P ∗.
By the assumed external exchangeability of Y , the marginal distribution of Y under Qt is
my desired hypothetical response distribution, Pt. However, in the absence of actual uniform
application of treatment t to the data subjects (which in any case is not simultaneously possible
for both values of t), I may not be able to estimate this marginal distribution. In the data, the
treatment will have been applied in accordance with the selection process, so that Tˇ = T ∗, and the
only observations I will have under regime Tˇ = 1 (say) are those for which T ∗ = 1. From these I
can estimate the conditional distribution of Y , given T ∗ = 1. under Q1—but this need not agree
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with the desired marginal distribution P1 of Y under Q1.
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7.1 Ignorability
The above complication will be avoided when I judge that, both for t = 1 and for t = 0, if I intervene
to apply treatment Tˇ = t on an individual, the ensuing response Y will not depend on the intended
treatment T ∗ for that individual; i.e., we have independence of Y and T ∗ under each Qt. This can
be expressed as the extended conditional independence property
Y ⊥⊥T ∗ | Tˇ . (9)
When (9) can be assumed to hold, we term the assignment process ignorable. In that case, my
desired distribution for Y , under hypothesised active treatment assigment Tˇ = 1, is the same as the
conditional distribution of Y given T ∗ = 1 under Tˇ = 1—which is estimable as the distribution of Y
in the treatment group data. Likewise, my distribution for Y under hypothesised control treatment
is estimable from the data in the control group.
The ignorability condition (9) requires that the distribution of an individual’s response Y , under
either applied treatment, will not be affected by knowledge of which treatment the individual had
been fingered to receive—a property that would likely fail if, for example, treatment selection T ∗ was
related to the overall health of the patient. Note that ignorability is not testable from the available
data, in which Tˇ = T ∗. For we would need to test, in particular, that, for an individual taking
actual treatment Tˇ = 1, the distribution of Y given T ∗ = 1 is the same as that given T ∗ = 0. But
for all such individuals in the data we never have T ∗ = 0, so can not make the comparison. Hence
any assumption of ignorability can only be justified on the basis of non-empirical considerations.
The most common, and most convincing, basis for such a justification is when I know that the
treatment assignment process has been carried out by a randomising device, which can be assumed
to be entirely unrelated to anything that could affect the responses; but I might be able to make
a non-empirical arguments for ignorability in some other contexts also. Indeed, it would be rash
simply to assume ignorability without having a good argument to back it up.
8 The idle regime
As a useful extension of the above analysis, we expand the range of the regime indicator Tˇ to
encompass a further value, which we term “idle”, and denote by ∅—this indicates the observational
regime, where treatments are applied according to plan. (This is relevant only for the data indi-
viduals, in D: I myself care only about the two interventions I am considering). We denote this
3-valued regime indicator by FT .
Now T ∗ is determined prior to any (actual or hypothetical) treatment application, and behaves
as a covariate. It is thus reasonable to assume that, under the observational regime FT = ∅, T ∗
retains its fixed covariate distribution P ∗. And since this distribution is then the same in all three
12Note that I can not make use of the conditional distributions of Y given T ∗. Typically I myself do not even have,
let alone observe, a value for T ∗0 . And even in the special case that my value T
∗
0 is well-defined, and I can assume
external validity for the pair (T ∗, Y ), I can at best estimate one of the two required conditional distributions. Thus
if I have been fingered for treatment, T ∗0 = 1, I would need the conditional distribution of Y given T
∗ = 1 under Qt,
for both t = 0 and t = 1. But for t = 0 this will not be estimable from the data, since there were no data subjects
who were fingered for treatment but did not receive it.
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regimes, we thus have
T ∗⊥⊥FT . (10)
This extends (8) to include also the idle regime.
We now introduce a new stochastic domain variable T , representing the treatment actually
applied when following the relevant regime. This is fully determined by the pair (FT , T
∗), as
follows:
Definition 1 (Applied Treatment, T )
(i). If FT = 0 or 1, then T = FT
(ii). If FT = ∅, then T = T ∗.
In particular, T ∼ P ∗ under FT = ∅, while T has a degenerate distribution at t under FT = t (t = 0
or 1). 2
In each of the three regimes we can observe both T and Y . In the observational regime (FT = ∅)
we can also recover T ∗, since T ∗ = T . However, T ∗ is typically unobservable in the interventional
regimes, and may not even be defined for myself, the case of interest.
To complete the distributional specification of the idle regime we argue as follows. Under
FT = ∅, the information conveyed by learning T = t is twofold, conveying both that the individual
was initially fingered to receive treatment t, i.e. T ∗ = t, and that treatment t was indeed applied.
Hence for any domain variable V , the conditional distribution of V given T = t (equivalently,
given T ∗ = t), under FT = ∅, should be the same as that of V given T ∗ = t, under the (real or
hypothetical) applied treatment FT = t. We express this property formally as:
Definition 2 (Distributional Consistency) For any domain variable, or set of domain variables,
V ,13
V | (T = t, FT = ∅) [= V | (T ∗ = t, FT = ∅)] ≈ V | (T ∗ = t, FT = t) (t = 0, 1), (11)
where ≈ denotes “has the same distribution as”. 2
Distributional consistency is the fundamental property linking the observational and interventional
regimes. It is our, weaker, version of the (functional) consistency property usually invoked in the
potential outcome approach to causality—see § 11.1 below. In the sequel we shall take (11) for
granted.
Lemma 1 For any domain variable V ,
V ⊥⊥FT | (T, T ∗). (12)
Proof. We have to show that, for t, t∗ ∈ {0, 1}, it is possible to define a conditional distribution
for V , given T = t, T ∗ = t∗, that applies in all three regimes.
Let Πt,t∗ denote the distribution of V given T
∗ = t∗ in the interventional regime FT = t. This
is well-defined in the usual case that the event T ∗ = t∗ has positive probability (this probability
being the same in all regimes)—if not, we make an arbitrary choice for this distribution.
Consider first the case t = 1.
13Note that (11) holds, automatically, on taking for V the constructed variable T , since on each side the conditional
distribution for V ≡ T is the one-point distribution on the value t.
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(1). Since T is non-random with value 1 in regime Ft = 1, Π1,t∗ is also, trivially, the distribution
of V given T = 1, T ∗ = t∗ in regime FT = 1.
(2). Under regime FT = 0, the event T = 1, T
∗ = t∗ has probability 0, so we are free to define
the distribution of V conditional on this event arbitrarily; in particular we can take it to be
Π1,t∗ .
(3). Under regime FT = ∅, the event T = 1, T ∗ = 0 has probability 0, so we are free to define the
distribution of V conditional on this event as Π1,0.
(4). It remains to show that the distribution of V given T = T ∗ = 1 in regime FT = ∅ is Π1,1.
Since, under FT = ∅, T ≡ T ∗, we need only condition on T = 1. The result now follows from
distributional consistency (11).
Since a parallel argument holds for the case t = 0, we have shown that Πt,t∗ serves as the
conditional distribution for V given (T = t, T ∗ = t∗) in all three regimes, and (12) is thus proved.
2
8.1 Graphical representation
The properties (10) and (12) are represented graphically (using d-separation) by the absence of
arrows from FT to T
∗ and to Y , respectively, in the ITT (intention to treat) DAG of Figure 5,
where again, a round node represents a stochastic variable, and a square node a non-stochastic
regime indicator. In addition, we have included further optional annotations:
• The outline of T ∗ is dotted to indicate that T ∗ is not directly observed
• The heavy outline of T indicates that the value of T is functionally determined by those of
its parents FT and T
∗
• The dashed arrow from T ∗ to T indicates that this arrow can be removed (there is then no
dependence of T on T ∗) under either of the interventional settings FT = 0 or 1.
Y 
T* 
FT T 
Figure 5: DAG representing T ∗⊥⊥FT and Y ⊥⊥FT | (T, T ∗)
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Remark 1 Note that, on further taking into account the functional relationship of Definition 1,
Figure 5 already incorporates the distributional consistency property of Definition 2, for V ≡ Y .
For we have
Y | (T = t, FT = ∅) = Y | (T = t, T ∗ = t, FT = ∅) (13)
≈ Y | (T = t, T ∗ = t, FT = t) (14)
= Y | (T ∗ = t, FT = t). (15)
Here (13) follows from (ii) of Definition 1; (14) from Lemma 1 with V ≡ Y , i.e. Y ⊥⊥FT | (T, T ∗),
which is represented in Figure 5; and (13) from (i) of Definition 1. 2
Now the ITT variable T ∗, while crucial to understanding the relationship between the different
regimes, is not itself directly observable. If we confine attention to relationships between the domain
variables, Figure 5 collapses into the essentially vacuous DAG of Figure 6, expressing no non-trivial
conditional independence properties. So without further assumptions there is no useful structure
Y FT T 
Figure 6: Vacuous DAG between FT , T and Y , ignoring T
∗
of which to avail ourselves.
8.2 Ignorability
Suppose now we impose the additional ignorability property (9). Noting that Tˇ = t is identical
with FT = t, this is equivalent to
Y ⊥⊥T ∗ | FT = t (t = 0, 1). (16)
Equivalently, since T is non-random in an interventional regime,
Y ⊥⊥T ∗ | (T, FT = t) (t = 0, 1).
Moreover, since in the idle regime, T ∗ is identical with T , so non-random when T is given, we
trivially have
Y ⊥⊥T ∗ | (T, FT = ∅).
We thus see that ignorability can be expressed as:
Y ⊥⊥T ∗ | (T, FT ). (17)
Lemma 2 If ignorability holds, then
Y ⊥⊥FT | T . (18)
20
Proof. We first dispose of the trivial case that T ∗ has a one-point distribution. In that case the
conditioning on T ∗ in (12) is redundant and we immediately obtain (18).
Otherwise, 0 < pr(T ∗ = 1) < 1. We then have
Y | (T = 1, FT = ∅) ≈ Y | (T ∗ = 1, FT = 1) (19)
≈ Y | FT = 1 (20)
≈ Y | (T = 1, FT = 1). (21)
Note that all conditioning events have positive probability in their respective regimes. Here (19)
holds by distributional consistency (11), (20) by ignorability (16), and (21) because, under FT = 1,
T = 1 with probability 1. So we have a common well-defined distribution, ∆1 say, for Y given
T = 1 in both regimes FT = ∅ and FT = 1. Further, since under FT = 0 the event T = 1 has
probability 0, we are free to define the conditional distribution of Y given T = 1 in regime FT = 0
as ∆1 also, so making ∆1 the common distribution of Y given T = 1 in all 3 regimes, showing that
Y ⊥⊥FT | T = 1. Since a similar argument holds for conditioning on T = 0 the result follows. 2
Remark 2 An apparently simpler alternative proof of Lemma 2 is as follows. By Lemma 1, the
conditional distribution of Y , given (FT , T, T
∗), does not depend on FT , while by (17) this condi-
tional distribution does not depend on T ∗. So (it appears), it must follow that it depends only on
T , whence Y ⊥⊥ (FT , T ∗) | T , implying the desired result. This is a special case of a more general
argument: that X ⊥⊥Y | (Z,W ) and X ⊥⊥Z | (Y,W ) together imply X ⊥⊥ (Y,Z) |W . However this
argument is invalid in general (Dawid 1979b). To justify it in this case we have needed, in our proof
Lemma 2, to call on structural properties (in particular, distributional consistency, and the way in
which T is determined by FT and T
∗) in addition to conditional independence properties. 2
Corollary 1 Ignorability holds if and only if
Y ⊥⊥ (T ∗, FT ) | T . (22)
Proof.
If: Further conditioning (22) on FT yields (17).
Only if: Property (22) is equivalent to the conjunction of (17) and (18).
2
8.2.1 Graphical representation
The DAG representing (10) and (22) is shown in Figure 7. Compared with Figure 5, we see that
the arrow from T ∗ to Y has been removed.
Remark 3 We might try and make the deletion of the arrow from T ∗ to Y in Figure 5 into a
graphically based argument for Lemma 2, for it appears to impose just the additional conditional
independence property (17) representing ignorability, and to imply the desired result (18). However
this is again a misleading argument: inference from such surgery on a DAG can only be justified
when it has a basis in the algebraic theory of conditional independence (Dawid 1979a; Constanti-
nou and Dawid 2017), which here it does not, on account of the fallacious argument identified in
Remark 2. 2
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Y 
T* 
FT T 
Figure 7: Modification of Figure 5 representing ignorability
Figure 8 results on “eliminating T ∗” from Figure 7: that is to say, the conditional independencies
represented in Figure 8 are exactly those of Figure 7 that do not involve T ∗. In this case, the only
such property is (18).
Y FT T 
Figure 8: Collapsed DAG under ignorability, representing Y ⊥⊥FT | T
The ECI property (18), and the DAG of Figure 8, are the basic (respectively algebraic and
graphical) representations of “no confounding” in the DT approach, which has been treated as a
primitive in earlier work. The above analysis supplies deeper understanding of these representations.
Although on getting to this point we have been able to eliminate explicit consideration of the
treatment selection variable T ∗, our more detailed analysis, which takes it into account, makes
clear just what needs to be argued in order to justify (18): namely, the property of ignorability
expressed algebraically by (16) or (17) and graphically by Figure 7, and further described in § 7.1.
9 Covariates
The ignorability assumption (9) will often be untenable. If, for example, those fingered for treatment
(so with T ∗ = 1) are sicker than those fingered for control (T ∗ = 0)—as might well be the case in a
non-randomised study—then (under either treatment application Tˇ = t, t = 0, 1) we would expect a
worse outcome Y when knowing T ∗ = 1 than when knowing T ∗ = 0. However, we might be able to
reinstate (9) after further conditioning on a suitable variable X measuring how sick an individual is.
That is, we might be able to make a case that, after restricting attention to those individuals having
a specified degree X = x of sickness, the further information that an individual had been fingered
for treatment would make no difference to the assessment of the individual’s response (under either
treatment application). This would of course require that, after taking sickness into account, the
treatment assignment process was not further related to other possible indicators of outcome (e.g.,
sex, age,. . . ). If it is, these would need to be included as components of the (typically multivariate)
variable X. We assume that the appropriate variable X is (in principle at least) fully measurable,
both for the individuals in the study and (unlike T ∗) for myself. We assume internal exchangeability
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of (X,T ∗, Y ), extending this to external exchangeability for (X,Y ).14
If and when such a variable X can be identified, we will be able to justify an assumption of
conditional ignorability :
Y ⊥⊥T ∗ | (X, Tˇ ). (23)
Furthermore, to be of any use in addressing my own decision problem, such a variable must be
a covariate, available prior to treatment application, and so, in particular must (jointly with T ∗,
at least for the study individuals, for whom T ∗ is defined) have the same distribution under either
hypothetical treatment application. This is expressed as
(X,T ∗)⊥⊥ Tˇ . (24)
In particular, there will be a common marginal distribution, PX say, for X, in both interventional
regimes.
When both (23) and (24) are satisfied, we call X a sufficient covariate. These properties are
represented by the DAG of Figure 9.
Y 
X T* 
Ť 
Figure 9: DAG representing sufficient covariate X: (X,T ∗)⊥⊥ Tˇ and Y ⊥⊥T ∗ | (X, Tˇ ).
9.1 Idle regime
As in § 8, we introduce the regime indicator FT , allowing for consideration of the “idle” observational
regime FT = ∅, in addition to the interventional regimes FT = t (t = 0, 1); and the constructed
“applied treatment” variable T of Definition 1. Arguing as for (17), (23) implies
Y ⊥⊥T ∗ | (X,T, FT ). (25)
Lemma 3 Let X be a sufficient covariate. Then
(X,T ∗) ⊥⊥ FT (26)
Y ⊥⊥ (T ∗, FT ) | (X,T ). (27)
Proof. By distributional consistency (11),
X |T ∗ = 1, FT = ∅ ≈ X |T ∗ = 1, FT = 1
≈ X |T ∗ = 1, FT = 0
14This last condition could be relaxed, allowing my own distribution for X to differ from that in the data, while
retaining conditional exchangeability for Y , given X. For simplicity we do not consider this further here.
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by (24). HenceX ⊥⊥FT | T ∗ = 1. A parallel argument showsX ⊥⊥FT | T ∗ = 0, so thatX ⊥⊥FT | T ∗.
On combining this with (10) we obtain (26).
As for (27), this is equivalent to the conjunction of (25) and Y ⊥⊥FT | (T,X). The argument
for the latter (again, requiring distributional consistency) parallels that for (18), after further con-
ditioning on X throughout. 2
The properties (26) and (27) are embodied in the DAG of Figure 10. This implies, on eliminating
FT Y 
X 
T 
T* 
Figure 10: Full DAG with sufficient covariate X and regime indicator
the unobserved variable T ∗:
X ⊥⊥ FT (28)
Y ⊥⊥ FT | (X,T ), (29)
as represented by Figure 11. Properties (28) and (29), as embodied in Figure 11, are the basic DT
FT Y 
X 
T 
Figure 11: Reduced DAG with sufficient covariate X and regime indicator
representations of a sufficient covariate. Assuming X, T and Y are all observed, this is what is
commonly referred to as “no unmeasured confounding”.
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10 More complex DAG models
10.1 An example
Consider the following story. In an observational setting, variableX0 represents the initial treatment
received by a patient; this is supposed to be applied independently of an (unobserved) characteristic
H of the patient. The variable Z is an observed response depending, probabilistically, on both the
applied treatment X0 and the patient characteristic H. A subsequent treatment, X1, can depend
probabilistically on both Z and H, but not further on X0. Finally the distribution of the response
Y , given all other variables, depends only on X1 and Z. Figure 12 is a DAG representing this story
by means of d-separation.
X0 Z
H X1
Y
(a)
X0
x0
Z(x0)
H
X1(x0)
x1
Y (x0, x1)
(b)
Figure 15: (a) A DAG G in which Robins’ condition (46) is falsely claimed
not to hold; see Ex. 11.3.3, Fig. 11.12 in Pearl (2009, p.353); H is unobserved;
(b) the template G(x0, x1).
Pearl claims on p.352 that he “derived” the sufficiency of condition
(3.62*) for the g-formula by applying Theorem 4.4.1 in (Pearl, 2009). This
cannot be the case since the latter, which appears in (Pearl and Robins,
1995), is true, while the former is false.
4.2.2 Examples claiming to show extensions of the g-formula
After presenting the (flawed) criterion (3.62*) Pearl also presents examples,
which he incorrectly claims show instances in which a g-formula may be
applied even though Robins’ criterion fails to hold. One example is based
on a mathematical error, the others on misconceptions concerning prior
work.
4.2.3 Example: Failure to correctly assess context specific inde-
pendence in twin networks
Example 11.3.3 in Pearl (2009) is the graph shown48 in Figure 15(a). We
reproduce Pearl’s discussion regarding this example:
Figure [15(a)] demonstrates a case where [(46)] is not satisfied [...]
but the graphical condition (3.62∗) is. It is easy to see that (3.62∗) is
satisfied; all back-door action-avoiding paths from X1 to Y are blocked
by {X0, Z}. At the same time, it is possible to show (using the Twin
48Where we have a hidden variable Z ← H → X2, Pearl uses a bi-directed edge Z ↔ X2.
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Figure 12: Observational DAG
In addition to the observational regime, we want to consider possible interventions to set values
for X0 and X1. We thus have two non-stochastic regime indicators, F0 and F1: Fi = xi indicates
that Xi is externally set to xi, while Fi = ∅ allows Xi to develop “naturally”. The overall regime
is thus determined by the pair (F0, F1).
Figure 13 augments Figure 12, in a seemingly natural way, to include these regime indicators.
It represents, by d-separation, ways in which the domain variables are supposed to respond to
interventions. For example, it implies Y ⊥⊥ (X0, H, F0, F1) | (Z.X1): once we know Z and X1, not
only are X0 and H irrelevant for pr babilistic pr diction of Y , but so too is the information as to
whether either or both of X0, X1 arose naturally, or were set by intervention. In particular, the
conditional distribution of Y given (Z,X1), under intervention at X1, is supposed the same as in
the observational regime modelled by Figure 12.
10.1.1 From observational to augmented DAG
It does not follow, merely from the fact that we can model the observational conditional indepen-
dencies between the domain variables by Figure 12, that their behaviour under the entirely different
circumstance of intervention must be as modelled by Figure 13. Strong additional assumptions are
required to bridge this logical gap. These we now elaborate.
We again introduce “intention to treat” variables, X∗0 and X
∗
1 , the realised X0 and X1, in any
regime, being given by
Xi =
{
X∗i if Fi = ∅
Fi if Fi 6= ∅.
(30)
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Y 
H 
F1 
Z 
X1 
X0 
F0 
Figure 13: Augmented DAG
Since, in the observational regime, Xi = X
∗
i , Figure 12 would still be observationally valid on
replacing each Xi by X
∗
i .
The different regimes are supposed linked together by the following assumptions, which we first
present and then motivate:
X∗0 ⊥⊥ (F0, F1) (31)
(H,Z,X∗1 , Y ) ⊥⊥ (F0, X∗0 ) | (F1, X0) (32)
(X∗0 , H, Z,X
∗
1 ) ⊥⊥ F1 | F0 (33)
Y ⊥⊥ (F1, X∗1 ) | (F0, X0, H, Z,X1). (34)
Note that, since Xi is determined by (Fi, X
∗
i ), (32) and (33) are equivalent to:
(H,Z,X∗1 , X1, Y ) ⊥⊥ (F0, X∗0 ) | (F1, X0) (35)
(X∗0 , X0, H, Z,X
∗
1 ) ⊥⊥ F1 | F0. (36)
Comments on the assumptions In order to understand the above assumptions, we should
consider Figure 12 as describing, not only the conditional independencies between variables, but
also a partial order in which the variables are generated: it is supposed that, in any regime,
the value of a parent variable is determined before that of its child. In particular it is assumed
that an intervention on a variable can not affect that variable’s non-descendants—including their
intention-to-treat variables and its own; but may affect its descendants—including their associated
intention-to-treat variables.
(i). Similar to (10), (31) expresses the property that an intention-to-treat variable, hereX∗0 , should
behave as a covariate for X0, and so be independent of which regime, here F0, is operating on
X0. Moreover, X
∗
0 should not be affected by a subsequent intervention (or none), F1, at X1.
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(ii). Assumption (32) is a version of the ignorability property (22). It says that an intervention
on X0 should be ignorable in its effect on all other variables. Moreover this should apply
conditional on F1, i.e. whether or not there is an intervention at X1.
Remark 4 As previously discussed, ignorability is a strong assumption, requiring strong
justification. Also note that, as shown by Corollary 1, (32) is implicitly assuming the distri-
butional consistency property (Definition 2), in addition to ignorability. 2
(iii). Assumption (33) expresses the requirement that (X∗0 , H, Z,X
∗
1 ), being generated prior to X1,
should not be affected by intervention F1 at X1. (However, they might depend on which
regime, F0, operates on X0.)
(iv). Similar to (ii), (34) says that, conditional on all the domain variables, (X0, H, Z), generated
prior to X1, the effect of intervention F1 at X1 is ignorable for its effect on Y ; moreover, this
should hold whether or not there is intervention F0 at X0. Informally, taken together with
(36), this requires that (X0, H, Z) form a sufficient covariate for the effect of X1 on Y .
In the following we make extensive (but largely implicit) use of the axiomatic properties of
(extended) conditional independence (Dawid 1979a; Pearl 1988):
P1 (Symmetry): X ⊥⊥Y | Z ⇒ Y ⊥⊥X | Z.
P2: X ⊥⊥Y | Y .
P3 (Decomposition): X ⊥⊥Y | Z and W a function of Y ⇒ X ⊥⊥W | Z.
P4 (Weak Union): X ⊥⊥Y | Z and W a function of Y ⇒ X ⊥⊥Y | (W,Z).
P5 (Contraction): X ⊥⊥Y | Z and X ⊥⊥W | (Y,Z) ⇒ X ⊥⊥ (Y,W ) | Z.
Lemma 4 Suppose that the observational conditional independencies are represented by Figure 12,
and that assumptions (31)–(34) apply. Then the extended conditional independencies between do-
main variables, intention-to-treat variables and regime indicators are represented by Figure 14.
Y 
H 
F1 
Z 
X1 
X0 
F0 
Figure 14: ITT DAG
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Remark 5 A further property apparently represented in Figure 14 is the independence of F0 and
F1:
F0⊥⊥F1. (37)
Now so far we have been able to meaningfully interpret an extended conditional independence as-
sertion only when the left-hand term involves stochastic variables only—which seems to render (37)
meaningless. Nevertheless, as a purely instrumental device, it is helpful to extend our understand-
ing by considering the regime indicators as random variables also. So long as all our assumptions
and conclusions do not involve regime indicators in their left-hand term, any proof that uses this
extended understanding will remain valid for the actual case of non-stochastic regime variables, as
may be seen by conditioning on these.15 2
In the light of Remark 5, we shall in the sequel treat F0 and F1 as stochastic variables, having
the independence property (37).
Proof of Lemma 4. Taking the variables in the order F0, F1, X
∗
0 , X0, H, Z,X
∗
1 , X1, Y , we need
to show the following series of properties, where each asserts the independence of a variable from
its predecessors, conditional on its parents in the graph.
F1 ⊥⊥ F0 (38)
X∗0 ⊥⊥ (F0, F1) (39)
X0 ⊥⊥ F1 | (X∗0 , F0) (40)
H ⊥⊥ (F0, F1, X∗0 , X0) (41)
Z ⊥⊥ (F0, F1, X∗0 ) | (X0, H) (42)
X∗1 ⊥⊥ (F0, F1, X∗0 , X0) | (H,Z) (43)
X1 ⊥⊥ (F0, X∗0 , X0, H, Z) | (X∗1 , F1) (44)
Y ⊥⊥ (F0, F1, X∗0 , X0, H,X∗1 ) | (Z,X1). (45)
On excluding (38), these conclusions will comprise the desired result.
For (38): By assumption (37).
For (39): By (31).
For (40): Follows trivially since X0, being functionally determined by (X
∗
0 , F0), has a conditional
one-point distribution, and so is independent of anything else.
For (41)–(43): From (35) we have
(H,Z,X∗1 )⊥⊥F0 | (F1, X0) (46)
while from (36) we have
(H,Z,X∗1 )⊥⊥F1 | (F0, X0). (47)
15It is not strictly necessary to regard the regime indicators as stochastic. Instead we can interpret (37) as
expressing the non-stochastic property of variation independence (Dawid 2001), meaning that the range of possible
values for each is unconstrained by the value taken by the other. Indeed, this is implicit in our interpretive comments
(i)–(iv) on conditions (31)–(34). We can then combine these two distinct interpretations of independence within the
same application, as we do here. For a rigorous analysis see Constantinou and Dawid (2017).
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We now wish to show that (46) and (47) imply
(H,Z,X∗1 )⊥⊥ (F0, F1) | X0. (48)
This requires some caution, on account of Remark 2. To proceed we use the fictitious inde-
pendence property (37).
From (36) we have X0⊥⊥F1 | F0, which together with (37) yields F1⊥⊥ (F0, X0), so that
F1⊥⊥F0 | X0. (49)
Combining (46) and (49) yields (F1, H, Z,X
∗
1 )⊥⊥F0 | X0 whence
(H,Z,X∗1 )⊥⊥F0 | X0. (50)
Finally, combining (50) and (47) yields (48).
Now (48) asserts that the conditional distribution of (H,Z,X∗1 ) given X0 is the same in all
regimes. In particular (noting that X∗1 = X1 in the observational regime), that conditional
distribution inherits the independencies of Figure 12. Properties (41)–(43) follow (on noting
that X0, being a function of F0 and X
∗
0 , is redundant in (41) and (43)).
For (44): Trivial since X1 is functionally determined by (F1, X
∗
1 ).
For (45): From (35) we derive both
Y ⊥⊥ F0 | (F1, X0, H, Z,X1) (51)
Y ⊥⊥ X∗0 | (F0, F1, X0, H, Z,X∗1 , X1). (52)
while from (34) we have
Y ⊥⊥ F1 | (F0, X0, H, Z,X1) (53)
Y ⊥⊥ X∗1 | (F0, F1, X0, H, Z,X1). (54)
We first want to show that (51) and (53) are together equivalent to
Y ⊥⊥ (F0, F1) | (X0, H, Z,X1). (55)
To work towards this, we note that, by (35), (H,Z,X1)⊥⊥F0 | (F1, X0), which together with
(49) gives (F1, H, Z,X1)⊥⊥F0 | X0, whence
F0⊥⊥F1 | (X0, H, Z,X1). (56)
Then (55) follows from (51), (53) and (56) in parallel to the argument above from (46), (47)
and (49) to (48).
Now in the observational regime, Y ⊥⊥ (X0, H) | (Z,X1). By (55), this must hold in all
regimes. This gives
Y ⊥⊥ (F0, F1, X0, H) | (Z,X1). (57)
Properties (54) and (57) are together equivalent to
Y ⊥⊥ (F0, F1, X0, X∗1 , H) | (Z,X1). (58)
Combining (58) with (52) now yields (45).
2
29
Augmented DAG Finally, having derived Figure 14 from assumptions (31)–(34), we can elim-
inate X∗0 and X
∗
1 from it. The relationships between the domain and regime variables are then
represented by the augmented DAG of Figure 13, which can now be used to express and manipulate
causal properties of the system, without further explicit consideration of the ITT variables—such
consideration only being required in making the argument to justify this use.
10.2 General DAG
The case of a general DAG follows by extension of the arguments of § 10.1 above. Consider a set
of domain variables, with observational independencies represented by a DAG D. We consider the
variables in some total ordering consistent with the partial order of the DAG.
Some of the variables, say (in order) (Xi : i = 1, . . . , k), will be potential targets for intervention,
with associated intention-to-treat variables (X∗i ) and intervention indicator variables (Fi). Let Vi
denote the set of all the domain variables coming between Xi−1 and Xi in the order. We thus
have an ordered list L = (V1, X1, . . . , Vk, Xk, Vk+1) of domain variables, some of which are possible
targets for intervention.
Let prei denote the set of all predecessors of Xi in L, including Xi, and suci the set of all
successors of Xi, excluding Xi. By pre
∗
i we understand the set where all action variables in prei
are replaced by their associated intention-to-treat variables, and similarly for suc∗i . Also Fi:j will
denote (Fi, . . . , Fj), and similarly for other variables.
Generalising (31) with (32), or (33) with (34), and with similar motivation, we introduce the
following assumptions (noting that Bi expresses a strong ignorability property for the effects of all
the variables (X1, . . . , Xi) on later variables—which would need correspondingly strong justification
in any specific application):
Ai : pre
∗
i ⊥⊥Fi:k | F1:i−1 (59)
Bi : suc
∗
i ⊥⊥ (F1:i, X∗1:i) | (Fi+1:k, prei). (60)
Taking account of the fact that Xi is determined by (Fi, X
∗
i ), these are equivalent to:
A′i : (V1:i, X
∗
1:i, X1:i−1)⊥⊥Fi:k | F1:i−1 (61)
B′i : (Vi+1:k, X
∗
i+1:k, Xi+1:k)⊥⊥ (F1:i, X∗1:i) | (Fi+1:k, V1:i, X1:i). (62)
Theorem 1 Suppose the observational conditional independencies are represented by a DAG D,
and that assumptions Ai and Bi (i = 1, . . . , k) hold. Then the extended conditional independencies
between domain variables, intention-to-treat variables, and regime variables (conditional on the
regime variables) are represented by the ITT DAG D∗, constructed by modifying D as follows:
• Each action variable Xi is replaced by the trio of variables Fi, X∗i and Xi, with arrows from
Fi and X
∗
i to Xi. It is assumed that (30) holds.
• Fi is a founder node.
• X∗i inherits all the original incoming arrows of Xi.
• Xi loses its original incoming arrows, but retains its original outgoing arrows.
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Proof. See Appendix A. 2
Finally, on eliminating the intention-to-treat nodes (X∗i ) from the ITT DAG, the relationships
between the domain variables and regime variables are represented by the augmented DAG D†,
constructed from D by adding, for each Xi, Fi as a founder node, with an arrow from Fi to
Xi. As described in § 2, such an augmented DAG is all we need to represent and manipulate
causal properties. The above argument shows what needs to be assumed—and, more important,
justified—to validate its use.
11 Comparison with other approaches
In this section we explore some of the similarities and differences between the decision-theoretic
approach to statistical causality, considered above, and other currently popular approaches.
11.1 Potential outcomes
In the potential outcome (PO) formulation of statistical causality (Rubin 1974; Rubin 1978), the
conception is that (for a generic individual) there exist, simultaneously and before the application
of any treatment, two variables, Y (0) and Y (1): Y (t) represents the individuals’s potential response
to the (actual or hypothetical) application of treatment t. If treatment 1 (resp., 0) is in fact
applied, the corresonding potential outcome Y (1) (resp., Y (0)) will be uncovered and so rendered
actual, the observed response then being Y = Y (1) (resp., Y = Y (0)); however the alternative,
counterfactual, potential outcome Y (0) (resp., Y (1)) will remain forever unobserved—a feature
which Holland (1986) has termed the fundamental problem of causal inference, although it is not
truly fundamental, but rather an artefact of the unnecessarily complicated PO approach.
The pair (Y (1), Y (0)) is supposed to have (jointly with the other variables in the problem)
a bivariate distribution, common for all individuals—this might be regarded as generated from
an assumption of exchangeability of the pairs (Yi(1), Yi(0)) across all individuals i ∈ I. The
marginal distribution of Y (t) can be identified with our hypothetical distribution Pt for the (single)
response variable Y under hypothesised application of treatment t, and is thus estimable from
suitable experimental data. However, on account of the fundamental problem of causal inference
no empirical information is obtainable about the dependence between Y (0) and Y (1), which can
never be simultaneously observed.
Causal effect If I (individual 0) consider taking treatment 1 [resp., 0], I would then be looking
forward to obtaining response Y0(1) [resp., Y0(0)]. Causal interest, and inference, will thus centre on
a suitable comparison between the two potential responses. The PO approach typically focuses on
the “individual causal effect”, ICE := Y (1)− Y (0). However, again on account of the fundamental
problem of causal inference, ICE is never directly observable, and even its distribution can not
be estimated from data except by making arbitrary and untestable assumptions (e.g., that Y (1)
and Y (0) are independent, or alternatively—”treatment-unit additivity, TUA”—that they differ
by a non-random constant). For this reason attention is typically diverted to the average causal
effect , ACE := E(ICE). Since this can be re-expressed as E{Y (1)} − E{Y (0)}, and the individual
expectations are estimable, so is ACE: indeed, although based on a different interpretation and
expressed in different notation, it is essentially the same as our own definition (7) of ACE, which
was introduced as one form of comparison between the two distributions, P1 and P0, for the single
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response Y—rather than, as in the PO approach, an estimable distributional feature of the non-
estimable comparison ICE between the two variables Y (1) and Y (0).
Consistency In the PO approach, consistency refers to the property
Y = Y (T ), (63)
requiring that the response Y should be obtainable by revealing the potential response corresponding
to the received treatment T . We can distinguish two aspects to this:
(i). When considered only in the context of an interventional regime FT = t, (63) can be regarded
as essentially a book-keeping device, since Y (t) is defined as what would be observed if
treatment t were applied.
(ii). But when it is understood as applying also in the observational regime, (63) has more bite, re-
quiring that an individual’s response to received treatment T should not depend on whether
that treatment was applied by a (real or hypothetical) extraneous intervention, or, in the
observational setting, by some unknown internal process. It is thus a not entirely trivial mod-
ularity assumption, forming the essential link between the observational and interventional
regimes.
A parallel to aspect (i) in DT is the temporal coherence assumption appearing in footnote 8: this
requires that uncertainty about the outcome Y , after it is known that treatment t has been applied,
should be the same as the initial uncertainty about Y , on the hypothesis that treatment t will be
applied. While not entirely vacuous, this too could be considered as little more than book-keeping.
More closely aligned with aspect (ii) is the distributional consistency property expressed in (11),
which says that, for purposes of assessing the uncertainty about the response to a treatment t, the
only difference between the interventional and the observational regime is that, in the latter, we
have the additional information that the individual had been fingered to receive t. Again this has
some empirical bite, and can be regarded as a not entirely trivial condition linking the observational
and interventional regimes in the DT approach.
Treatment assignment and application We have emphasised the distinction between the
stochastic treatment assignment variable T ∗ and the non-stochastic treatment application indicator
Tˇ . This is not explicitly done in the PO approach, but appears implicitly, since for any data
individual, with fingered (and thus also actual) treatment T ∗ (typically just denoted by T in PO),
we can distinguish between the actual response Y = Y (T ) in the observational regime, and the
potential responses Y (1) and Y (0), relevant to the two interventional regimes.
We can make the following correspondences:
Ignorability The PO expressions in (iv) and (v) of Table 1 have both been used to express
ignorability in the PO framework, (iv) evidently being weaker than (v). The weak ignorability
condition (iv) corresponds directly to the DT condition (9) for ignorability. However, the strong
ignorability condition (v) has no DT parallel, since nothing in DT corresponds to a joint distribution
of (Y (0), Y (1)). For applications weak ignorability (iv), which does have a DT interpretation,
suffices. Similar remarks apply to the (weak and strong) conditional ignorability expressions in (vi)
and (vii).
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PO DT
(i) Distribution of Y (t) Distribution of Y given Tˇ = t
(ii) Joint distribution of (Y (0), Y (1)) no parallel
(iii) Distribution of Y given T = t Distribution of Y given T ∗ = t, Tˇ = t
(iv) Y (t)⊥⊥T (t = 0, 1) Y ⊥⊥T ∗ | Tˇ
(v) (Y (0), Y (1))⊥⊥T no parallel
(vi) Y (t)⊥⊥T | X (t = 0, 1) Y ⊥⊥T ∗ | (X, Tˇ )
(vii) (Y (0), Y (1))⊥⊥T | X no parallel
Table 1: Comparison of PO and DT approaches
SUTVA and SUTDA It is common in PO to impose the Stable Unit-Treatment Value As-
sumption (SUTVA) (?; ?). This requires that, for any individual i, the potential response Yi(t)
to application of treatment t to that individual should be unaffected by the treatments applied to
other individuals. Indeed, without such an assumption the notation Yi(t) becomes meaningless,
since the very concept intended by it is denied.
Our variant of SUTVA is the Stable Unit-Treatment Distribution Assumption (SUTDA), as
described in Condition 1. (Note that, unlike for SUTVA, even when this assumption fails it does
not degenerate into meaninglessness, since the terms in it have interpretations independent of its
truth). On making the further assumption, implicit in the PO approach, that, not just the set of
values, but also the joint distribution, of the collection {Yi(t) : i ∈ I, t ∈ T } is unaffected by the
application of treatments, it is easily seen that SUTVA implies SUTDA, so that our condition is
weaker—and is sufficient for causal inference.
11.2 Pearlian DAGs
Judea Pearl has popularised graphical representations of causal systems based on DAGs. In §1.3 of
Pearl (2009) he describes what he terms a “Causal Bayesian Network” (CBN), which we shall call
a “Pearlian DAG”.16 This is intended to represent both the conditional independencies between
variables in observational circumstances, and how their joint distributions changes when interven-
tions are made on some or all of the variables: specifically, for any node not directly intervened
on, its conditional distribution given its parents is supposed the same, no matter what other in-
terventions are made.17 The semantics of a Pearlian DAG representation is in fact identical with
that, based entirely on d-separation, of the fully augmented observational DAG, in which every
observable domain variable is accompanied by a regime indicator—thus allowing for the possibility
of intervention on every such variable. However, although Pearl has occasionally included these
regime indicators explicitly, as do we, for the most part he uses a representation where they are
16We avoid the term “causal DAG”, which has been used with a variety of different interpretations (Dawid 2010).
17In the greater part of his causal writings, Pearl uses a different construction, in which all stochasticity is con-
fined to unobservable “error variables”, with domain variables related to these, and to each other, by deterministic
functional relationships—he misleadingly terms this deterministic structure a “probabilistic causal model” (PCM).
It is easy to show (Dawid 2002) that there is a many-one correspondence: any PCM implies a CBN structure for its
domain variables, while any CBN can be derived from a, typically non-unique, PCM. Since the additional, uniden-
tifiable, structure embodied in a PCM has no consequences for its use for decision-theoretic purposes, we do not
consider these further here.
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left implicit and omitted from the graph. A Pearlian DAG then looks, confusingly, exactly like the
observational DAG, with its conditional independendies, but is intended to represent additional
causal properties: properties that are explicitly represented by the corresponding augmented DAG.
Since such a Pearlian DAG is just an alternative representation of a particular kind of augmented
DAG, its appropriateness must once again depend on the acceptability of the strong assumptions,
described in § 10.2, needed to justify augmentation of an observational DAG.
11.3 SWIGs
Richardson and Robins (2013a); Richardson and Robins (2013b) introduce a different graphical
representation of causal problems, the SWIG (single world intervention graph). A salient feature
of this approach is “node-splitting”, whereby a variable is represented twice: once as it appears
naturally, and again as it responds to as intervention. Although the details of their representation
and ours differ, they are based on similar considerations. Here we consider some of the parallels
and differences between the two approaches.
Figure 3 of Richardson and Robins (2013a) (a single world intervention template, SWIT) is
reproduced here as Figure 15, with notation changed so as more closely to match our own. Note
the splitting of the treatment node T . As we shall see, this graph encodes ignorability of the
treatment assignment, and can thus be compared with our own representations of ignorability.
T t Y (t)
Figure 3: A template representing the two graphs in Figure 2.
X x Y (x)
H
Figure 4: The template resulting from intervening on X in the graph in
Figure 1(b).
A new graphical view of the back-door formula
In Figure 4 we show the template representing the graphs resulting from
intervening on X in the graph in Figure 1(b), which intuitively represents the
presence of confounding. In the potential outcomes literature, confounding
is expressed as non-independence of Y (x˜) and X for some x˜. This lack
of independence is consistent with Y (x) and X being d-connected in the
template shown in Figure 4 by the path X ← H → Y (x).
In contrast, Figure 5(a) shows a DAG in which L is observed, and is
sufficient to control confounding between X and Y . From the template in
Figure 5(b) we see that
X⊥⊥Y (x˜) | L, (7)
often referred to as conditional ignorability, holds. It is well known that this
condition is sufficient for the effect of X on Y to be given via the standard
adjustment formula:
P (Y (x˜)=y) =
∑
l
P (Y =y | L= l,X= x˜)P (L= l).11 (8)
Two further examples of graphs which imply X⊥⊥Y (x˜) | L are shown in
Figure 6; in these graphs H represents a hidden variable.
11This is also a special case of Theorem 22 in Section 4.
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Figure 15: Simple SWIG template, expressing PO (weak) ignorability
In Figure 15, T denotes the treatment applied in the observational regime: it thus corresponds
to our “intention-to-treat” variable T ∗. The node labelled t represents an intervention to set the
treatment to t: it therefore corresponds to Tˇ = t in our development. The variable Y (t), the
“potential response” to the intervention at t, has no direct analogue in our approach, but that is
inessential, since only its distribution is relevant; and that corresponds to our distribution Pt of Y
in response to the intervention Tˇ = t.
Applying the standard d-separation semantics to Figure 15 (ignoring the unconventional shapes
of some of the nodes), the disconnect between T and t represents their independence. This cor-
responds to our equation (8), encapsulating the covariate nature of T ∗. Further, by the lack of
an arrow from T to Y (t), the graph encodes Y (t)⊥⊥T , which is to say that the distribution of
Y (t)—the outcome consequent on a (real or hypothetised) intervention at t—is regarded as inde-
pendent of the intention-to-treat variable (and this property should hold for all t). In our notation,
this becomes Y ⊥⊥T ∗ | Tˇ , as expressed in our equation (9), and represents ignorability of the treat-
ment assignment. As described in § 7.1, in our treatment this can be represented by the DAG of
Figure 7—which is therefore our translation of the SWIT of Figure 15, conveying essentially the
same information in a different form.
Note that, in the approach of Richardson and Robins (2013a), in order fully to capitalise on
the ignorability preperty represented by Figure 15, additio al external use must be made f the
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assumption of (functional) consistency: T = t implies Y (t) = Y . For example, in this approach
the average causal effect ACE is defined as E{Y (0)−Y (1)}. Now by ignorability, as represented in
the SWIT of Figure 15, Y (t)⊥⊥T , whence E{Y (t)} = E{Y (t) | T = t}. But we then need to make
further use of functional consistency to replace this by E{Y | T = t}, so obtaining ACE = E{Y |
T = 1} − E{Y | T = 0}.
Our analogue of functional consistency is distributional consistency (Definition 2): Y | (T =
t, FT = ∅) ≈ Y | (T ∗ = t, FT = t). However, this property has already been used in justifying the
representation by means of Figure 7. Once that graph is constructed, distributional consistency
does not require further explicit attention since, as shown in Remark 1, it is already represented in
Figure 5, and thus in Figure 7. And then Figure 8 can be used directly to represent and manipulate
the fundamental DT representation of ignorability, as expressed by (18). Thus we define ACE =
E(Y | FT = 1) − E(Y | FT = 0). With ignorability expressed as Y ⊥⊥FT | T , as encoded in
Figure 7, we immediately have E(Y | FT = t) = E(Y | T = t, FT = t) = E(Y | T = t), and thus
ACE = E(Y | T = 1)− E(Y | T = 0).
A further conceptual advantage of our approach is that is unnecessary to consider (even one-
at-a-time) the distinct potential responses18 Y (t): we have a single response variable Y , but with
a distribution that may be regime-dependent.
12 A comparative study: g-computation
In this Section we compare, contrast, and finally unify, the various approaches to causal modelling
and inference, in the context of the specific example of § 10.1. We suppose we have observational
data, and wish to identify the distribution of Y under interventions at X0 and X1. Purely for
notational simplicity, we assume all variables are discrete
12.1 Pearl’s do-calculus
The do-calculus (Pearl 2009, § 3.4) is a methodology for discovering when and how, for a problem
represented by a specified Pearlian DAG, it is possible to use observational information to identify
an interventional distribution. Notation such as p(x | y, ẑ) refers to the distribution of X given the
observation Y = y, when Z is set by intervention to z. Pearl gives 3 rules, based on interrogation of
the DAG, that allow transformation of such expressions. If by successive application of these rules
we can re-express our desired interventional target by a hatless expression, we are done.
In this notation, we would like to identify p(y | x̂0, x̂1). We can write
p(y | x̂0, x̂1) =
∑
z
p(y | x̂0, x̂1, z)× p(z | x̂0, x̂1). (64)
According to Pearl’s Rule 2, we have
p(y | x̂0, x̂1, z) = p(y | x0, x1, z) (65)
because Y is d-separated from (X0, X1) by Z in the DAG of Figure 12 modified by deleting the
arrows out of X0 and X1.
18unhelpfully described as “counterfactuals” by Richardson and Robins (2013a)
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Next, again by Rule 2, we can show
p(z | x̂0, x̂1) = p(z | x0, x̂1) (66)
by seeing that Z is d-separated from X0 by X1 in the DAG modified by the deleting arrows into
X1 and out of X0.
Finally, by Rule 3, we confirm
p(z | x0, x̂1) = p(z | x0) (67)
because Z is d-separated from X1 by X0 in the DAG with arrows into X1 removed. So on combining
(66) and (67) we have shown
p(z | x̂0, x̂1) = p(z | x0). (68)
Inserting (65) and (68) into (64), we conclude
p(y | x̂0, x̂1) =
∑
z
p(y | x1, z)× p(z | x0), (69)
showing that the desired interventional distribution can be constructed from ingredients identifiable
in the observational regime. Equation (69) is (a simple case of) the g-computation formula of Robins
(1986).
12.2 DT approach
As described in Dawid (2015), the DT approach supplies a more straightforward way of justifying
and implementing do-calculus, using the augmented DAG. In our problem this is Figure 13, and
what we want is p(Y = y | F0 = x0, F1 = x1).
Noting F0 = x0 ⇒ X0 = x0 etc., in general we have:
p(Y = y | F0 = x0, F1 = x1) =
∑
z
p(Y = y | X0 = x0, X1 = x1, Z = z, F0 = x0, F1 = x1)
× p(Z = z | X0 = x0, F0 = x0, F1 = x1). (70)
Applying d-separation to Figure 13, we can infer the following conditional independencies:
Y ⊥⊥ (F0, X0, F1) | (Z,X1) (71)
Z ⊥⊥ (F0, F1) | X0. (72)
Using these in (70) we obtain
p(Y = y | F0 = x0, F1 = x1) =
∑
z
p(Y = y | X1 = x1, Z = z, F0 = ∅, F1 = ∅)
× p(Z = z | X0 = x0, F0 = ∅, F1 = ∅), (73)
which is (69), re-expressed in DT notation.
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12.3 PO approach
The Pearlian/DT approach makes no use of potential outcomes. By contrast, these are fundamental
to the original approach of Robins, where the conditions supporting g-computation are:
Y (x0, x1) ⊥⊥ X1 | (Z,X0 = x0) (74)
Z(x0) ⊥⊥ X0. (75)
In his Example 11.3.3, Pearl (2009), basing his argument on his “twin-network” construction,
claims that (74) can not be derived from a PO interpretation of Figure 12. However, Richardson
and Robins (2013a) refute this by constructing the SWIT version of Figure 12, as in Figure 16.
X0 Z
H X1
Y
(a)
X0
x0
Z(x0)
H
X1(x0)
x1
Y (x0, x1)
(b)
Figure 15: (a) A DAG G in which Robins’ condition (46) is falsely claimed
not to hold; see Ex. 11.3.3, Fig. 11.12 in Pearl (2009, p.353); H is unobserved;
(b) the template G(x0, x1).
Pearl claims on p.352 that he “derived” the sufficiency of condition
(3.62*) for the g-formula by applying Theorem 4.4.1 in (Pearl, 2009). This
cannot be the case since the latter, which appears in (Pearl and Robins,
1995), is true, while the former is false.
4.2.2 Examples claiming to show extensions of the g-formula
After presenting the (flawed) criterion (3.62*) Pearl also presents examples,
which he incorrectly claims show instances in which a g-formula may be
applied even though Robins’ criterion fails to hold. One example is based
on a mathematical error, the others on misconceptions concerning prior
work.
4.2.3 Example: Failure to correctly assess context specific inde-
pendence in twin networks
Example 11.3.3 in Pearl (2009) is the graph shown48 in Figure 15(a). We
reproduce Pearl’s discussion regarding this example:
Figure [15(a)] demonstrates a case where [(46)] is not satisfied [...]
but the graphical condition (3.62∗) is. It is easy to see that (3.62∗) is
satisfied; all back-door action-avoiding paths from X1 to Y are blocked
by {X0, Z}. At the same time, it is possible to show (using the Twin
48Where we have a hidden variable Z ← H → X2, Pearl uses a bi-directed edge Z ↔ X2.
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Figure 16: SWIT
This DAG encodes the property
Y (x0, x1)⊥⊥X1(x0) | (Z(x0), X0)
whence
Y (x0, x1)⊥⊥X1(x0) | (Z(x0), X0 = x0). (76)
They then apply functional consistency, X0 = x0 ⇒ Z(x0) = Z,X1(x0) = X1, to deduce (74). As
for (75), this is directly encoded in Figure 16.
12.4 Unification
We can use the DT approach to relate all the approaches above.
12.4.1 DT for SWIG/PO
Figure 14, using explicit “intention to treat” variables and regime indicators, is the DT reinterpre-
tation of the SWIT of Figure 16.
From Figure 14 (noting that the dotted arrow from X∗1 to X1 disappears when F1 6= ∅) we can
read off
Y ⊥⊥X∗1 | Z,X0, F0, F1 = x1,
so that
Y ⊥⊥X∗1 | Z,X0 = x0, F0 = ∅, F1 = x1, (77)
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which is the DT paraphrase of (74). Similarly the DT paraphrase of (75),
Z ⊥⊥X∗0 | F0 = x0, (78)
is likewise encoded in Figure 14. (In particular, both these properties are consequences of our
assumptions (31)–(34), together with (30).)
12.4.2 Consistency?
Note that the derivations in § 12.4.1 above do not require further explicit application of (functional
or distributional) consistency conditions. We could have complicated the analysis by mimicking
more closely that of § 12.3. The DT paraphrase of (76), which can be read off Figure 14, is
Y ⊥⊥X∗1 | Z,X∗0 , F0 = x0, F1 = x1.
On restricting to X∗0 = x0 and applying the distributional consistency condition, we obtain the DT
paraphrase of (74):
Y ⊥⊥X∗1 | Z,X0 = x0, F0 = ∅, F1 = x1.
But note that the required distributional consistency property can be expressed as
Y ⊥⊥ (X∗1 , F0) | (Z,X0, F1 = x1),
and this is already directly encoded in Figure 14. That being the case, we can leave it implicit and
shortcut the analysis, as in § 12.4.1
12.4.3 DT for Pearl
We have shown that, if we can justify the DT ITT representation of Figure 14, we can derive
(74) and (75), the conditions used to derive the g-computation formula (69) in the PO approach.
However, the same end-point can be reached much more directly. Extracting from Figure 14 the
conditional independencies between just the observable variables and the intervention indicators
(i.e., eliminating X∗0 and X
∗
1 ), we recover Figure 13, the DT version of the Pearlian DAG Figure 12.
From this, as shown in § 12.2, (69) can readily be deduced directly, without any need to complicate
the analysis by consideration of potential outcomes. As described in § 10.1.1, consideration of
intention-to-treat variables is needed to justify the appropriateness of the augmented/Pearlian DAG
of Figure 13; but once that has been done, for further analysis we can simply forget about the ITT
variables X∗0 and X
∗
1 .
Dawid and Didelez (2010), §10.1.1, show how the PO conditions typically imposed to justify
more general forms of g-computation imply the much simpler DT conditions supporting more
straightforward justification. The DT approach can, moreover, be straightforwardly extended to
allow sequentially dependent randomised interventions, which can introduce considerable additional
complications for the PO approach.
13 Discussion
In this paper we have developed a clear formalism for problems of statistical causality, based on
the idea that I want to use external data to assist me in making a decision. We have shown
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how this serves as a firm theoretical foundation for methods framed within the DT approach,
enabling transfer of probabilistic information from an observational to an interventional setting.
We have emphasised, in particular, just what considerations are involved—and so what needs to
be argued for—when we invoke enabling assumptions such as ignorability. In the course of the
development we have introduced DT analogues of concepts arising in other causal frameworks,
including consistency and the stable unit-treatment value assumption, and clarified the similarities
and differences between the different approaches.
General though our analysis has been, it could be generalised still further. For example, our
exchangeability assumptions treat all individuals on a par. But we could consider more complex
versions of exchangeability, such as are relevant in experimental designs where we distinguish var-
ious factors which may be crossed or nested (Dawid (1988), Dawid (2000) § 10.1); or conducted
more detailed modelling of non-exchangeable data. Our analysis of DAGs in this article has been re-
stricted to non-randomised point interventions, taking no account of information previously learned.
Further extension would be needed to fully justify, e.g., DT models for dynamic regimes (Dawid
and Didelez 2010).
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A Proof of Theorem 1
As in Remark 5, and purely as an instrumental tool, we regard all the regime variables as stochastic
and mutually independent:
k
⊥⊥
i=1
Fi. (79)
We shall show that D∗ then represents the conditional independencies between all its variables.
The desired result will then follow on conditioning on F1:k.
For economy of notation, we write Wi for (Vi, Xi), Wa:b for (Va:b, Xa:b). and similarly W
∗
i , W
∗
a:b.
Lemma 5 For each r = 1, . . . , k − 1,
Hr : Fr+1:k ⊥⊥F1:r |W1:r. (80)
Proof. We show (80) by induction.
By (79), F1⊥⊥F2:k, while by A′2 we have W1⊥⊥F2:k | F1. Together these yield (F1,W1)⊥⊥F2:k,
from which H1 follows.
Suppose now Hr holds. From B
′
r we have
Wr+1⊥⊥F1:r | (Fr+1:k,W1:r). (81)
Together with Hr this gives
(Fr+1:k,Wr+1)⊥⊥F1:r |W1:r (82)
whence
Fr+1⊥⊥F1:r | (Fr+2:k,W1:r+1). (83)
Also, by A′r+2,
W1:r+1⊥⊥Fr+2:k | F1:r+1, (84)
which together with F1:r+1⊥⊥Fr+2:k, from (79), gives (F1:r+1,W1:r+1)⊥⊥Fr+2:k, from which we
have
Fr+2:k ⊥⊥F1:r+1 |W1:r+1. (85)
So Hr+1 holds and the induction is established. 2
Lemma 6 For each r:
(Vr+1, X
∗
r+1)⊥⊥ (F1:k, X∗1:r) | (V1:r, X1:r). (86)
Proof.
From B′r, we have
W ∗r+1⊥⊥F1:r | (Fr+1:k,W1:r). (87)
Combining this with (80) gives
(Fr+1:k,W
∗
r+1)⊥⊥F1:r |W1:r,
whence
W ∗r+1⊥⊥F1:r |W1:r. (88)
43
Also, from A′r+1,
W ∗r+1⊥⊥Fr+1:k | (F1:r,W1:r).
Together with (88) this gives
W ∗r+1⊥⊥F1:k |W1:r. (89)
Also from B′r we have
W ∗r+1⊥⊥X∗1:r | (F1:k,W1:r). (90)
Now combining (89) and (90) we obtain (86). 2
To complete the proof of Theorem 1, consider the sequence
L∗ = (F1, . . . , Fk, V1, X∗1 , X1, . . . , Vk, X
∗
k , Xk, Vk+1).
which is consistent with the partial order of the ITT DAG D∗. Each Vi may comprise a number
of domain variables: we consider it as expanded into its constituent parts, respecting the partial
order of D, and thus of D∗.
To establish Theorem 1, we show that each variable in L∗ is independent of its predecessors in
L∗, conditional on its parent variables in D∗.
(i). For each Fi, this holds by (79).
(ii). For an intervention target Xi, its only parents in D∗ are X∗i and Fi. By (30), conditional on
these Xi is fully determined, hence independent of anything.
(iii). Consider now a non-intervention domain variable, U say. Its parents in D∗ are the same as its
parents in D. Now U is contained in Vr for some r. By (86) its conditional distribution, given
all its predecessors in L∗, depends only on the preceding domain variables. In particular,
this conditional distribution, being the same in all regimes, must agree with that in the
observational regime, whose independencies are encoded in the initial DAGD—and so depends
only on the parents of U in D, and hence in D∗.
(iv). The remaining case, of an ITT variable X∗i , follows similarly to (iii), on further noting that
the parents of X∗i in D∗ are the same as the parents of Xi in D, and X∗i is identical to Xi in
the observational setting.
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